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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
My dissertation focuses on the influence of politics, policies, and markets in determining
oil and natural gas and wind energy development.  In the first chapter, I examine the role of
federal elected political influence and market factors in determining the acres of oil and natural
gas leases issued on Bureau of Management (BLM) lands in the western United States between
1978 and 2008.  I seek to determine if the political party and ideology of the federal political
environment influence the number of acres that are leased and if there is disparate federal
political influence in states that have a large amount of federal lands.  Using a random effects
Tobit model for a 17-state sample of the westernmost states in the contiguous United States, I
find that more conservative federal political influence leads to additional leasing.  The results are
consistent across Senate committee leaders, Senate majority leadership, and the President’s
office.  The further found that the influence of politics on leasing is not stronger in states with
more federal lands.
In the second chapter, I analyze the influence of state and federal political party changes
and market factors on state oil and natural gas permitting.  My findings, using a first-differenced
empirical model for two samples, a 19-state sample, from 1990-2007, and a 14-state sample,
from 1977-2007,  indicate that the influence of state political party changes are trumped by
economic factors.  Oil and gas prices are the main drivers of permitting changes, while the state
political party changes for the state legislatures and Governor’s office are consistently not
significant.
In the third chapter I focus on the role of electricity markets and renewable energy
regulation in wind development across the United States.  My findings, using a random effects
Tobit model with a 25-state sample, from 1994-2008, indicate that the implementation of state
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Renewables Portfolio Standards (RPS), the Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC), and Green
Power Purchase Programs (GPP) positively influence a state’s wind capacity.  The influence of
green power purchase programs continues to increase in the years after implementation, while
for RPS it diminishes. The role of market factors is less significant.
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1CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION
Energy generation is a crucial factor in long run economic growth across the United
States and throughout the world.   The sources of future energy generation and how much of that
energy should be green energy are hotly debated topics among policy makers and citizens alike.
Rising energy costs for fossil fuels, the innate non-renewability of these resources, and concerns
over climate change are all playing a role in the call for an increase in renewable energy sources.
This drive for renewable energy can be seen through calls for renewable energy production
subsidies, demands for additional renewable energy sources for consumers, and both national
and local political debates about the role of government in promoting a new energy economy.
The partisan divide on this issue harkens back to existing ideological differences between
Democrats and Republicans in the United States.  Calls for additional regulation of fossil fuel
resources and increased subsidization of renewable energy sources have largely come from the
more liberal Democratic politicians, while Republicans have generally been more supportive of
increased development of existing fossil fuel resources to meet the U.S. energy needs and more
skeptical of increased regulatory burdens on energy producers.  My dissertation examines the
influence of  both Federal and State governments on energy markets, focusing on the oil and
natural gas and wind energy markets.  I analyze the role that political party, ideology, and salient
policies have on these markets to determine if it is politics or prices that were the dominant
factor that determines the amount of energy development that took place in the United States
over the last few decades.
2CHAPTER 2
Drill Baby Drill?
Political and Market Influences on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing in
the Western United States
3Purpose
In this chapter, I analyze the political and market determinants of federal onshore oil and
natural gas leasing in the western United States.  Previous research on this topic has focused on
examining either oil and natural gas markets or federal bureaucratic outcomes generally.  I
synthesize both the market and political determinants of federal lease issuance and provide a
theoretical and empirical framework for analyzing the determinants of oil and gas leasing on
BLM lands in the contiguous western United States.  Using a supply and demand framework, I
move away from the existing research that analyzes either oil and gas market factors or the role
of the federal political and bureaucratic structure.  By focusing on both simultaneously it is
possible to ascertain whether the influence of politics or resource prices are the main
determinants of leasing on federal lands in the western United States.  Also, given the potentially
important influence of both market and political factors, the inclusion of both sets of measures in
this analysis mitigates issues of omitted variables bias, which is a concern when either set of
factors is analyzed separately.
The existing market literature provides both theoretical and empirical analyses, but the
empirical work focuses on offshore rather than onshore leasing.  In addition, this literature does
not focus directly on the political determinants of lease issuance.  The existing literature on
federal leasing has instead largely focused either on auction price theory to analyze the process
for issuing competitive leases (Moody and Kruvant, 1988; Hendricks, Porter, and Tan, 1993;
Hendricks, Pinske, and Porter, 2003), or on the determinants of oil and gas supply and
production using a market supply and demand framework. (Walls, 1992; Iledare and Pulsipher,
1999)
The federal political environment in the United States and its influence on bureaucratic
outcomes has been extensively studied in the literature.  This literature has focused on two areas:
4the influence of political parties, and the influence of politicians on bureaucratic outcomes.  The
findings regarding political party vary.  There is a significant literature arguing that political
parties matter in a variety of political outcomes (Levy, 2004; Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Rohde
1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993), but there is also a literature that argues that the role of
political parties is dominated by other political factors including individual ideology and the
legislative committee system. (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987)  This
chapter delves into the debate by including measures of political party and ideology for various
salient political actors, including the federal legislative and executive leadership as well as
relevant committee leaders.
Several papers have examined the degree of influence that a political leader has on
Congressional and bureaucratic outcomes. One set of literature argues that bureaucrats have
significant discretion in terms of bureaucratic outcomes (Niskanen 1975) while another body of
literature argues that elected officials have a dominant role in dictating the bureaucratic
environment and legislative outcomes.  (Cropper, 1992; Moe, 2006; Ringquist, 1995; Shipan,
2004; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Wood, 1988; and Wood and Waterman, 1991) This literature
has provided analyses of the role of various federal bureaucracies, but has not provided an
evaluation of the roles of political and bureaucratic influence in BLM leasing.  This chapter does
not directly measure the relationship between bureaucrats and elected political leaders and
instead focuses on the role of federal political leadership and the influence that changes in
political party and ideology have on the overall political environment.  A subsequent extension
of this research question will focus more directly on the role of the bureaucratic leadership at the
BLM.
5Background
State Oil and Gas Resources
The western states were chosen because they contain approximately 81 percent of the
proved natural gas reserves and 90 percent of the proved oil reserves in the contiguous United
States over this time frame.1,2  Also, these states compose 92 percent of the leases issued by the
BLM over this time period.  The remaining eight percent is dispersed across an additional 31
states in the eastern United States.3
Table 1 shows the states included in the analysis and gives information on the oil and gas
resources in each state.
1 In this chapter, the western states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
2 The time frame for these statistics is from 1978 through 2007.
3 Alaska is also has significant oil and natural gas reserves, however, given the unique political and resource
environment the state is excluded from this analysis.  Also, the LR2000 leasing database maintained by the BLM
does not contain information for Alaska.
6Table 1: Oil and Gas Resources by State
State Oil Resources Natural Gas Resources
Arizona ? Minimal oil resources ? Minimal natural gas resources
California ? Third largest crude oil reserves in the
U.S.
? 10% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? Less than 2% of total U.S. production
Colorado ? 3 of the top 100 oil fields in the U.S.
? 1% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? 10 of the top 100 natural gas fields in the
U.S.
? 5% of total U.S. annual production on
average
Idaho ? No oil resources ? No natural gas resources
Kansas ? 2% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? One of the top producing natural gas
fields in the U.S.
Montana ? 2 of the top 100 oil fields in the U.S.
? 2% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? Minimal production
Nebraska ? Minimal oil resources ? Minimal natural gas resources
Nevada ? Minimal oil resources ? Minimal natural gas resources
New Mexico ? 3% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? 10% of total U.S. annual production on
average
North
Dakota
? 2% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? 1% of total U.S. annual production on
average
Oklahoma ? 2 of the top 100  oil fields in the U.S.
? 3% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? 12 of the top 100 natural gas fields in the
U.S.
? 10% of total U.S. annual production on
average
Oregon ? Minimal oil resources ? No natural gas resources
South
Dakota
? Minimal oil resources ? Minimal natural gas resources
Texas ? 20 of the top 100 oil fields in the
U.S.
? 1/4 of U.S. oil reserves
? 1/3 of U.S. natural gas reserves
? 1/3 of U.S. natural gas annual production
on average
Utah ? 4 of the top 100 oil fields in the U.S.
? 1% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? 2 of the top 100 natural gas fields in the
U.S.
? 2% of total U.S. annual production on
average
Washington ? No oil resources ? No natural gas resources
Wyoming ? 3% of total U.S. annual production
on average
? 10% of total U.S. annual production on
average
Source: EIA, State Energy Profiles
7Figures 1 and 2 show the amount of natural gas and oil proved reserves for each state and
year.4
Figure 1: Natural Gas Reserves
5
4 Proved reserves are a measure of the economically feasible reserves and are therefore strongly influenced by price.
Due to the correlation of reserves and the economic measures, other measures will be used in the analysis as
indicators of state resources.  See the data and empirical sections for a full discussion.
5
8Figure 2: Oil Reserves
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The table and two figures demonstrate the significant contribution that several of the
sample states make towards United States oil and gas production.  They also show the variation
in resource endowments across states in this panel.
Leasing Process
To understand the potential avenues of political and market influence in oil and gas
leasing, it is important to understand the history and process of leasing.  Oil and natural gas
leasing on federal lands in the United States is a divisive issue that has pitted environmental
groups against energy producers.  The federal government is embroiled in this controversy due to
its management of federal mineral resources and its authority over lease sales and use.
6 Note: Idaho and Washington also lack oil reserves and Oregon joins this group for oil.  Again, these states did have
some lease issuance over this time frame.  Figure’s 3 and 4 below contain the number and acres of competitive
leases issued over time by state
9Specifically, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), under the direction of the Department of
the Interior (DOI), is responsible for almost 700 million acres of federal mineral estate lands,
mostly in the western United States.  This includes 258 million surface acres of BLM lands and
the federal mineral estate that lies under federal lands managed by other federal agencies.7  In
addition, the federal mineral estate includes federal minerals under surface land that is privately
owned, but for which the federal government administers the subsurface mineral rights.8  In the
federal mineral estate, approximately 12 million acres contain oil and natural gas and of these
acres approximately 470,000 acres have oil and gas activities.  According to the BLM, the
“domestic production from over 63,000 Federal onshore oil and gas wells accounts for 11
percent of the Nation’s natural gas supply and five percent of its oil.” (BLM, Oil and Gas)
Onshore oil and gas resources thus compose an important part of the nation’s energy supply.
The BLM’s responsibility for managing these resources derives primarily from two
historic acts: The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands
of 1947, which give the BLM responsibility for oil and natural gas leasing. (MacDonald 6-7, 15-
16).  While the BLM has been existed since 1946 and has issued mineral leases since its
inception, it was not given its official mission until Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).  (Muhn and Stuart, 1988, p.158)   Prior to 1976, the
BLM inherited its mission from the two organizations that preceded it, the General Land Office
and the Grazing Service.  Oil and natural gas leasing at the BLM was and continues to be
dictated largely by the two historic acts of 1920 and 1947, but the FLMPA in 1976 underscored
7 In addition to leasing on BLM lands, the BLM also issues leases on lands managed by other federal agencies,
primarily the U.S. Forest Service.  For the purpose of this analysis, all leases issued on Forest Service lands have
been excluded.  Future analysis will focus on analyzing potential leasing differences between BLM and Forest
Service lands.
8 Private land leases are not tracked by all states in the sample.  For this sample, some leases on private lands have
been included where the data did not allow for their exclusion.  Future work will focus on the role of mineral leasing
on private surface lands.
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the overall mission of the BLM as an agency dedicated to “the principles of multiple use and
sustained yield.” (Muhn and Stuart, 1988, p.158)  In addition, the 1970’s began with the passage
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which profoundly influenced the
way that the BLM manages its public resources. Consideration of environmental impacts from
oil and gas leasing and other activities became a legally dictated process requiring environmental
impact statements and additional public influence in the overall land use planning process.
(Muhn and Stuart, 1988, p.158)
After the 1970’s, the mission of the BLM continued to evolve and was shaped by three
other major regulatory changes.  The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987
(FOOGLRA) and the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 and 2005.  Of these, the influence of the 1987
Act was by far the strongest.  This act amended the leasing act of 1920, which led to changes in
the definition of leasing types and gave the Forest Service the authority to dictate leasing on their
lands, among other changes.  In addition to the executive management of these agencies, the
legislative environment has also significantly influenced the DOI and BLM through major
legislative changes such as the FLPMA and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).  Also, appointees to the Secretary of Interior and BLM director posts are approved by
the federal legislature. Thus, executive management and Congressional influence have shaped
the mission of both the DOI and BLM and altered the course of federal lands management.
The goal and definition of responsible drilling on public lands became a contentious issue
in the 1960s and early 1970s with the rise of the conservation movement. (Muhn and Stuart,
1988, p. 104) During this time the BLM “began to transform itself from an agency primarily
processing land and mineral applications into an agency actively planning for the nation’s future
11
needs.” (Muhn and Stuart, 1988, p. 106)  This transformation led to more thorough land
management planning.
Currently, drilling on federal lands begins with the formation of a land management plan.
Under NEPA, there are five phases of land use planning for oil and gas development on federal
lands.  The first is the creation of a Resource Management Plan (RMP), which designates the
areas of land that are available for oil and gas leasing.  For areas that are designated as open for
development, “the RMP analyzes impacts of reasonably foreseeable development and spells out
any stipulations needed to provide extra protection for sensitive resources in the plan area.”
(BLM, Land Use)  The resources requiring protection range from sensitive ecosystem areas to
specific wildlife.  After a parcel of land is designated as available for leasing in an RMP, the land
can be leased.
Since the passage of FOOGLRA in 1987, the leasing process begins with a request from
an individual or corporation interested in leasing the land.  Then the BLM reviews the request
and if the land is not restricted from leasing, opens up the requested parcel of land for a lease
sale, abiding by any stipulations for environmental protection. (BLM, Competitive)  The leases
are sold at competitive auctions that are held quarterly. (BLM, Competitive)  The successful
bidder gains “the right to explore and drill for, extract, remove, and dispose of deposits of oil and
gas found on the lease.” (BLM, Competitive) In addition to competitive leases, the BLM also
issues noncompetitive leases.  Since 1987, noncompetitive leases “may be issued only for parcels
that have been offered competitively and failed to receive a bid.” (BLM, Noncompetitive)  Prior
to 1987, there was no requirement that leases be offered at competitive auction prior to
noncompetitive purchase.  Leases could be requested by producers and sold without entering the
competitive auction process.  This significant change in leasing type had a strong influence on
12
the number of competitive leases issued as is shown in Figure 5.  The empirical analysis includes
an indicator to capture the effects of this significant regulatory change.9
The energy policy acts also led to policy changes.  Since the energy policy act passed in
1992, both competitive and noncompetitive leases are valid for a minimum of 10 years, and
remain valid as long the lease is producing.  Prior to the 1992 Act, competitive leases were valid
for only five years if not producing. The leases do require that a nominal yearly rental payment is
made in addition to the auction price.  Currently, the “annual fee is $1.50 per acre for the first
five years and $2.00 per acre each year thereafter.” (BLM, Competitive)  In addition to a rental
fee, if oil and gas is produced, royalties are gathered based on production amounts.10  While
leasing is a key step in the oil and natural gas production process, it is important to note that
leasing a parcel of land doesn’t lead directly to production, because in addition to a lease, a
producer is required to have a permit for each well drilled.
The permitting process follows the issuance of a lease.  Once a leaseholder applies for a
permit the BLM does a site review to determine what if any environmental impacts must be
considered.  For drilling operations that are expected to have significant environmental impacts,
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required, while for less significant expected impacts
a less stringent environmental assessment (EA) is required.  The BLM will approve or deny a
permit based on whether if meets the requirements of existing environmental regulations.  If
approved the permit is valid for two years or until the lease expires. (BLM , Environmental)
Although permitting is an important land management issue, this project focuses on leasing.  The
9 For this analysis, the focus is on competitive leases only.  After 1987, the influence of politics on leasing is
expected to be strongest with competitive leases.  These leases represent the point where the BLM determined that
the lands would be made available for leasing.  After 1987 all noncompetitive leases issued had already been offered
for competitive lease by the BLM.  Future analyses will focus on the role of both competitive and noncompetitive
leasing.
10 Royalties are collected by the Minerals Management Service.
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lease provides the producer with the right to develop the resource, after obtaining a valid permit,
and is therefore a critical step in producing oil and gas. Future work will extend this analysis
beyond federal leasing to well permitting issues.
Political Influence
“For the rural areas of the West, where federal lands dominate the landscape, it is not
farfetched to say that these lands have a unique political system seen nowhere else in
the United States.” (Nelson, 2000, p. 143)
For the 11 westernmost states in the contiguous United States approximately 25% of the
land is under the management of the BLM (See Table 2).11  This varies significantly, from 68%
in Nevada to only 1% in Washington.  Nelson argues that due to this federal ownership, the
federal government exerts stronger political influence in these 11 western states than in the
United States generally.  Specifically he states that there “is a de facto legislature for much of the
rural West and a de facto executive branch, both located in Washington.” (Nelson, p. 144)
This chapter uses separate data sets to examine the role of political influence in the 11
westernmost states.12  To investigate the potentially disparate role of political influence in these
westernmost states, the BLM states, I analyzed them separately.  First, I analyzed two sets of
states, the BLM states sample and the full sample to determine if the BLM states received
relatively more political influence.  Second, I analyzed the full sample including an analysis of
the interaction between the BLM states and politics.  The BLM states in the sample are quite
distinct from the remaining states in terms of BLM lands, the additional states generally have
11 The 11 westernmost states geographically make up a subset of the larger 17-state sample.  This 11-state sample
includes Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming.
12 In this chapter, the 11 westernmost states or 11 western states refers to the 11 westernmost states in the contiguous
United States.
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less than 1% of their lands owned by the BLM. 13  The additional states are geographically
adjacent to the first sample and contain a mixture of oil and natural gas producing states such as
Texas and Oklahoma and states such as Nebraska that do not have significant resources.  This
variation also occurs in the 11 state sample, which includes Wyoming and Colorado, both
important oil and natural gas producers and states such as Washington and Oregon that have
much lower levels of oil and natural gas resources. See Table 1 for information on oil and natural
gas resources in each state.
To analyze the political influence on oil and natural gas leasing, I examine several
measures of the political environment.  Specifically, I analyze the influence of the federal
legislature, the party and ideology of the Senate Majority Leader and House Speaker, as well as
the party and ideology of relevant committee chairs in the House and Senate.  Due to the fact that
Congress provides the regulatory framework that the DOI and BLM operate in, I expect that the
legislature will influence leasing.  In particular, the role of relevant committees is expected to be
particularly important given their role in setting the agenda of the Congress since potential
legislation must pass out of committee prior to consideration by the full Congress.  Also,
committees can use their influence to hold agencies and corporations publicly accountable
through hearings.  I expect committee ideology to have a stronger influence than the legislative
leadership.
In addition to legislative influence, I analyze the party and ideology of the President.  The
President appoints the leadership of the DOI and sets the tone for the political climate in the
United States generally.  Due to their appointment by the President, there is not a party
difference between Presidents and Secretaries of the Interior.  For this reason, the President’s
13 To verify the definition of BLM states based on Nelson’s argument, I used a Probit model to predict the BLM
states based on BLM acres and compared the predicted values with the BLM state categorization.  The results
indicate a clear distinction between BLM states and the other states in the sample.
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party and also ideology are expected to also represent the leadership at the DOI.  For each
elected official, I expect both party and ideology to be important in influencing leasing.
The conventional wisdom is that in politics, party matters.  It is a signal of a politician’s
stance on a variety of social and economic issues.  The notion of pro-business Republicans
resisting regulation and pro-regulation Democrats pushing for it is common across policy arenas.
Republicans generally have pushed for increased domestic energy development while Democrats
have been more reticent to lease, noting the environmental impacts of development.  Prior to
elections, these divergent party stances on oil and gas leasing are incorporated into each
candidate’s platform.  After election, commitment to a particular party tends to constrain a
politician’s choices. (Levy, 2004; Cox and McCubbins 1994)  For these reasons, party
differences among politicians are expected to lead to a clear delineation in leasing outcomes
along party lines.  Given the platforms of the Republican and Democratic parties, one would
expect pro-oil and gas development policies under a Republican administration and reduced oil
and gas development under a Democratic administration.
Individual ideology is also expected to play an important role.  The ideology measure
captures the degree of conservatism of each individual politician based on their voting history.
This measure provides a unique measure for each individual and Congress and therefore
provides a more detailed measure for each politician than the overall political party measures.
Given the variance of this measure over individuals and across time, I expect ideology to be a
more accurate measure of the political environment than political party.  Prior to a discussion of
the data and presentation of the empirical results, the theoretical framework is presented below.
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Theoretical Framework
The focus of the theoretical framework is to incorporate political indicators and market
measures to determine their influence on leasing. The theoretical framework is based on the
standard economic supply and demand model.  In this case, however, the supply side is
determined primarily by elected officials who establish the amount of land that will be available
for leasing based on ideology and party affiliation, while the demand side is determined by
profit-maximizing oil and gas producers who base their demand for leases on relevant market
factors.
Politics and Federal Leasing: Supply
The federal political actors have three possible avenues of influence on the supply of
leases:  direct influence on the acres of leases offered, Xi, indirect influence on leasing through
regulations on leasing, RL, and indirect influence on leasing through regulations on resource
development post-leasing, Ry.
Xi = f(Z, li) (1)
The acres of leases offered, Xi, is a function of the political affiliation of a set of relevant political
actors Z, and the available land area for leasing, li.14  The allocation varies by state, i, and
depends on the amount of BLM lands available for leasing in each state.  Specifically, li is a
continuous measure from 0 to Li of the acres of BLM land available for leasing in each state.
In addition to the direct influence of Z on Xi, Z influences leasing through regulations
such that
h(Z) = (RL, Ry) (2)
14 Z is not indexed by state in this model because the political actors are elected at the federal level.  Future
extensions will focus on the role of the state delegations in the legislature.
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Specifically, for both leasing and development regulations it is expected that decreases in Z will
lead to additional regulations. A more liberal ideology is expected to lead to additional
regulation.15 (h’(Z) < 0 over ?1	 ? ? ? 1	)
Z, political affiliation, takes one of two forms.
?1	 ? ? ? 1	
OR (3)
Z = 0 if Democrat and 1 if Republican
The first form of Z is a variable distributed between -1 and 1 where -1 is liberal and 1 is
conservative.16  The second measurement of Z is a binary variable indicating political party
affiliation.  The continuous variable indicates a politician’s ideology based on the voting record
in each session of Congress and therefore can shift over time for each individual.  Party
affiliation is not time dependent.
Further, based on the theory of political influence proposed by Nelson (2000), I expect
that the 11 westernmost states, BLM states, will experience a disparately large influence from the
elected political leadership as compared with the full 16-state sample due to the relatively large
allotment of BLM lands in those states.
Oil and Gas Producers: Demand
Firms use the existing level of technology to produce the profit maximizing level of oil
and natural gas.  For the j-th producer:
qj = g(xj,yj) (4)
15 In the theoretical model, regulations are defined to include environmental, health, and safety regulations that add
to operating costs and therefore lead to decreases in leasing.  The converse of these types of regulations are
regulations that are designed to lead to increased competitive leasing, such as FOOGLRA.  I expect regulations that
are designed to increase leasing will do so and will be more prominent in Republican regimes.
16 See Carroll et al, 2010, for a complete description of the construction of the ideology scores.
18
The production of oil and natural gas, qj, is determined by a uniform production function that
varies across firms by the acres of leases that it has, xj, and its input choice for the second
composite input, yj.17  For the j-th profit maximizing producer:
?? = pg(x?, y?)	– (w? + R?)x? + (w? + R?)y?	 (5)
Input costs for leasing and development, wL and wy, are increasing with increasing regulation.
The leases are allocated in such a way that producer j acquires some acres of leases J ? N, where
N is the total acres of leases supplied.  Solving the standard profit maximizing model leads to
some important implications regarding the role of input costs and prices.  It can be shown that:
Leasing:
???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0, ???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0
Composite development good:
???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0,					 ???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0
Leasing volume will decrease as leasing costs increase and as regulations for leasing increase.
The influence of development costs and development regulations is not clear in this case.  A
similar case is found for the composite development good.  In addition, it can be shown that in
terms of prices, an increase in oil and/or natural gas price will lead to either an increase in
leasing or an increase in development or both, but the specific influence is not known given the
standard profit maximization assumptions.  The next section presents the data set that I
constructed to test these theoretical implications, followed by the empirical results.
Data
To analyze this research question, I collected data from a variety of sources and
constructed a matrix of market and political variables to determine what factors were influencing
oil and natural gas leasing across a 17-state sample over a 31 year time frame from 1978 through
17 The second composite good represents all other inputs into production including development inputs such as
drilling capital and labor.
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2008.18,19  The states in the sample and the percentage of BLM lands in each state are included in
Table 2.  Lease information was collected from the BLM LR2000 database which contains all
leasing activity tracked by the BLM.  Specifically, the “LR2000 provides reports on BLM land
and mineral use authorizations for oil, gas, and geothermal leasing, rights-of-ways, coal and
other mineral development, land and mineral title, mining claims, withdrawals, classifications,
and more on federal lands or on federal mineral estate.”  (BLM, LR2000)
Table 2: Federal Mineral Estate and BLM Lands by State
State Land Total
(Million
Acres)
Federal
Minerals
(Million
Acres)
BLM Public
Landsa
(Million
Acres)
Percentage
BLM Lands
Arizona 72.69 35.8 12.2 16.78%
California 100.21 47.5 15.3 15.27%
Colorado 66.49 29 8.3 12.48%
Idaho 52.93 36.5 11.6 21.92%
Kansas 52.51 0.8 0 0.00%
Montana 93.27 37.8 7.9 8.47%
Nebraska 49.03 0.7 0.1 0.20%
Nevada 70.26 58.7 47.8 68.03%
New Mexico 77.77 36 13.4 17.23%
North Dakota 44.45 5.6 0.1 0.22%
Oklahoma 44.09 2.3 0.1 0.23%
Oregon 61.6 33.9 16.1 26.14%
South Dakota 48.88 3.7 0.2 0.41%
Texas 168.22 4.5 0.1 0.06%
Utah 52.7 35.2 22.8 43.26%
Washington 42.69 12.5 0.4 0.94%
Wyoming 62.34 41.6 18.3 29.36%
a: "On these public lands, the BLM manages both surface resources and subsurface minerals."
Source: BLM, Public Land Statistics
18 The initial sample included the 17 western states, but Kansas is excluded because there are no BLM lands in
Kansas according to the 2008 public land statistics.  The 2008 public land statistics are based on information
collected in 1999 and 2007.
19 The time frame is dependent on the control variables that are included.  Oil futures prices are available only back
to 1983, natural gas futures prices are available only back to 1994.  Well costs are available only through 2007.
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For this analysis, I focus only on acres of competitive oil and natural gas leases that were
issued by the BLM on BLM land.  Since the 1987 regulatory change, all leases must first be
issued competitively and are only available for noncompetitive lease if they are not leased at the
competitive auction.  Since the initial leasing decision is made by the BLM in the competitive
leasing stage, I expect the political influence to be most dominant when competitive leases are
issued as opposed to noncompetitive lease issuance.20
Figures 3 and 4 present the numbers and acres of competitive leases issued by each state
over the sample time frame.  The figures demonstrate the wide variation in both leasing volume
and timing.
20 See Table 8 for an analysis and using both competitive and non-competitive leases
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Figure 3: Competitive Leases Issued by the BLM
22
Figure 4: Thousands of Acres of Competitive Leases Issued by the BLM
Figure 5 shows the total number of competitive leases and acres of competitive leases
issued by the BLM for these 17 states by year.
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Figure 5: Competitive Leases and Thousands of Acres of Competitive Leases Issued by the
BLM in the United States
There is a marked increase in 1988 due to the regulatory change in the definition of
competitive and noncompetitive leases in 1987.  I include a post-1987 indicator to address this
trend in the leasing data.21
Along with the measure of the acres of competitive leases issued, I also use the acres of
BLM lands contained in each of the Western states to construct the dependent variable.  I use this
information to construct a measure of the acres of competitive leases issued per acre of BLM
lands.  As I discussed in the theoretical framework, I expect the available land for leasing in each
21 I also include indicators for post-1992 and post-2005 to capture the influence of the Energy Policy Acts.
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state to influence the number and acres of available leases.  By including a measure for leasing
potential, the disparate influence of available land for leasing is included as a direct control.22
In addition to the dependent variable, I constructed several market variables.  The market
data include information on prices and futures prices for both oil and natural gas, that I collected
from the Energy Information Association (EIA).23  For oil price I use real first purchase oil price,
which is defined by the EIA as the price paid during the initial transaction involving an equity
transfer of the crude oil at the lease site. (EIA, Oil Price)  For natural gas, I use natural gas real
commercial price, which is available for all sample states over this time frame.24  For both sets of
prices I construct a three-year moving average of price rather than current or lagged prices to
provide a more inclusive measure of the influence of previous prices on leasing.  In addition to
current prices, I also use futures prices as an indicator of expected prices for producers.25
Futures prices are reported by the EIA weekly, from this information I constructed an annual
average for both oil and natural gas.26  Lastly, I constructed a measure of the annual real well
costs for the United States based on information provided by the EIA.27  Well costs, measured in
thousands of dollars per well drilled, provide a measure of the direct costs that producers face in
extracting resources.
In addition to market factors, the key variables of interest in this analysis are the political
indicators.  The political party indicators are constructed as binary measures for the chair of the
22 The acres of BLM lands is a coarse measure of leasing potential since there are areas of BLM which are not
available for leasing due to wilderness protection areas, etc.  Also, this is not a measure of the geologic potential of
each state for oil and natural gas production, to control for within state differences, I use a random effects model.  A
complete discussion of the empirical strategy is included in the next section.
23 All prices and well costs are real prices, in chained (2000) U.S. dollars, calculated by using gross domestic
product price deflators from the EIA.
24 The EIA also tracks a measure of the NG wellhead price, but data is not available for all states so I used
commercial price.
25 I have data on oil futures prices back to 1983, while I have natural gas futures prices only back to 1994.  Given
that the two prices are correlated at 0.87, I use only oil futures prices in the results presented.
26 There are four futures contracts reported for delivery one, two, three, and four months in the future.  The futures
prices are highly correlated and only contract one is used in the analysis.
27 See Appendix D, Figure D1a which shows the variation in futures prices and well costs over time.
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Senate Natural Resource Committee (SNRC), chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee (SEPW), chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC), the Senate Majority
Leader, and the President of the United States.28  Additional House measures will be included
subsequently.  Due to a high degree of correlation between and within the House and Senate, the
measures are analyzed separately.  The continuous ideology measure provides a liberal-
conservative measure based on voting history for each legislator and the president.29 (Carroll et
al, 2010)  The indicators change at most every two years, by Congress, across individuals for the
sample time frame.30  In addition, the political party for the committee chairs, Senate Majority
Leader, and U.S. President are analyzed.  These measures do not change for individuals in this
sample and therefore vary over time only.  The empirical results are presented below.
Methodology - Empirical Framework
Based on the theoretical framework, the empirical analysis is focused on measuring the
federal legislative and executive influence on the acres of natural gas and oil leases issued in
each state and year by the BLM on BLM lands after controlling for market factors.  The
empirical specification is a state-year panel from 1978 through 2008 for a 16-state sample.  In
addition, I analyzed the 11 westernmost states, the BLM states, separately.  These panels allow
for the identification of significant changes in the political variables, which change at most
biannually with each Congress.  Given the distribution of the dependent variable, which is
censored at zero with approximately 30 percent of the observations at zero, a random effects
Tobit model was used.31,32,33 (Figure 6 contains graphs of the dependent variable by state.)
28 These committees were listed as a subset of the relevant committees with influence over the DOI by the Office of
Congressional and Legislative Affairs. (DOI, Committees)
29 The ideology scores that I used are the DW-Nominate scores.  These scores estimate the conservative-liberal
position of each legislator using roll call voting records.  The scores are scaled to range generally between -1, liberal
and 1, conservative.
30 Appendix D, Figure D2 shows the variation in the ideology scores over time.
31 The Tobit model provides measures of  both the probability that leasing will occur and the expected number of
acres leased per acre of BLM  land given that leasing has occurred.
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Figure 6:  BLM Acres Leased per Total BLM Acres by State
32 I include a linear random effects regression model in Appendix D, Table D1 for comparison.
33 The random effects Tobit model was tested against a pooled Tobit regression specification and was found to
provide a better fit.  Fixed effects Tobit was also considered, however, the fixed effects Tobit specification is known
to be biased.  For robustness, a Tobit was run with state indicator variables, the results were consistent, generally
leading to an increase in statistical significance for the political indicators.  In addition, I ran linear fixed effects and
random effects regressions and used a Hausman test to determine if the more efficient random effects model was
consistent with the fixed effects model.  The results indicate that the linear random effects model is consistent.
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The specification of the model is:
??? = ? ? + ???? + ?????? + ????? + ??????????????? + ???? + ??????1987??????????	+ ??????1992??????????	 + ??????2005??????????	 + ????
where Y ~ (0, ¥)
and ??? = ?? + ???
where i = state and t = year. Yit represents the annual state acres of oil and natural gas
competitive leases issued on BLM lands by the BLM per BLM acres in each state.  Also, it
should be noted that the acres of BLM lands in each state is not a precise measure of available
land for leasing, which is not tracked by the BLM.  Instead, the measure provides an upper
bound on the number of acres that can potentially be leased by the BLM. Zt represents a set of
federal executive and  legislative political party and ideology indicators.  Resource Price, pit,
represents either a three year moving average of annual real state natural gas or oil prices, or
futures prices for oil or natural gas34.  Well costs contains direct well costs that change over time
only.  Finally, Time Trend is a state-year indicator to control for overall trends in leasing.
  The analysis presented below begins with a discussion of the role of legislative
committees, followed by an analysis of the influence of the Senate Majority Leader, and then the
effect of the President’s office on leasing outcomes.
BLM States – The role of the U.S. Senate and Ideology
The regressions in Table 3 highlight the differences between the two sample groups using
the ideology score for the Senate Natural Resources Committee Chair (SNRC) as the political
variable of interest.  Column 1 presents results for the full 16-state sample, Column 2 for the
34 Futures prices for natural gas are available from 1994 through 2008, while futures prices for oil are available back
to 1983.  Given the high degree of correlation between these variables. .9.  Oil prices are used as an the indicator of
future resource prices.
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BLM states.  The positive sign of the coefficient indicates that a more conservative committee
chair leads to additional leasing, which confirms my hypotheses.
Table 3: Full Sample and BLM States Sample: Senate Committee (Tobit Random Effects)
Dependent Variable:  BLM
Acres Leased per Acre of
BLM Lands
Political Variable of Interest – Ideology of
Senate Natural Resources Committee Chair
(1)
Full 16-State
Sample
(2)
11 BLM State
U.S. Real Oil Futures
(Dollars per Barrel) 0.000223 0.000382
(0.471) (0.788)
Ideology Score Committee
Chair 0.0237* 0.0108
Continuous (-1, 1) (1.889) (0.852)
Count of Regulatory
Changes by Year of
Implementation -0.000256 -0.000126
(-0.312) (-0.152)
Post 1987 Indicator 0.0386*** 0.0280**
(3.072) (2.210)
Post 1992 Indicator 0.00465 0.000944
(0.424) (0.0852)
Post 2005  Indicator 0.0223 -0.00248
(1.165) (-0.126)
Time Trend 0.000118 8.98x10-5
(By State) (1.477) (1.580)
U.S. Real Cost per Crude
Oil, Natural Gas, and Dry
Well Drilled (Thousand
Dollars) 6.04x10-6 6.43x10-6
(0.566) (0.590)
Constant -0.0848*** -0.0674***
(-2.930) (-2.916)
?u (State specific standard
deviation) 0.0474*** 0.0306***
(4.891) (3.706)
?e (Observation specific
standard deviation) 0.0538*** 0.0462***
(23.04) (19.27)
? 0.437 0.304
Observations 400 275
Number of states 16 11
Pseudo R-squared .078 .041
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component. ?u: panel-level standard deviation; ?e: standard deviation of e_it.
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Specifically, the results in Table 3a show that, for the full sample, a one standard
deviation increase in the ideology score, from more moderate to more conservative results in an
approximately six percentage point increase in the probability of leasing.
Table 3a: Full Sample and BLM States Sample: Senate Committee (Marginal Effects)
 Dependent
Variable:  BLM
Acres Leased per
Acre of BLM
Lands
Political Variable of Interest – Ideology of Senate Natural
Resources Committee Chair
Probability of Leasing Expected Increase in Acres
Leased Given That Leasing Has
Occurred
(1)
Full 16-
State
Sample
(2)
11 BLM
States
(3)
Full 16-State
Sample
(4)
11 BLM States
U.S. Real Oil
Futures (Dollars
per Barrel) 0.00124 0.00274 7.92x10-5 0.000133
(0.471) (0.786) (0.471) (0.785)
Ideology Score
Committee Chair 0.132* 0.0778 0.00840* 0.00376
Continuous (-1, 1) (1.865) (0.849) (1.857) (0.849)
Count of
Regulatory
Changes by Year
of Implementation -0.00142 -0.000906 -9.08x10-5 -4.39x10-5
(-0.312) (-0.152) (-0.312) (-0.152)
Post 1987 Indicator 0.208*** 0.195** 0.0125*** 0.00891**
(3.132) (2.294) (3.200) (2.346)
Post 1992 Indicator 0.0258 0.00677 0.00164 0.000328
(0.424) (0.0852) (0.426) (0.0853)
Post 2005
Indicator 0.123 -0.0178 0.00859 -0.000852
(1.183) (-0.127) (1.073) (-0.128)
Time Trend 0.000658 0.000644 4.20x10-5 3.12x10-5
(By State) (1.471) (1.577) (1.463) (1.563)
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled (Thousand
Dollars) 3.36x10-5 4.61x10-5 2.14x10-6 2.23x10-6
(0.566) (0.590) (0.565) (0.590)
Observations 400 275 400 275
Number of states 16 11 16 11
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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In addition, given that leasing has occurred, a one standard deviation increase in the
ideology score indicator, moving from a more moderate to a more conservative ideology,
increases the expected number of acres leased per BLM  lands by 0.3 percentage points, a small
impact given that the mean acres leased per acre of BLM lands is .011. These findings support
the hypothesis that increases in conservatism in relevant political actors increase the probability
of leasing.35  However, once leasing has occurred, political ideology has only a small influence
on acres leased.  This margin of influence indicates that the dominant method of influence of the
elected federal political actors is in determining whether or not a state leases, however, after
leasing has occurred, the federal political framework does not have an economically significant
influence on the amount of BLM land that is leased.36  This indicates that in years in which a
state is consistently leasing the elected federal influence is diminished compared with years in
which the state is on the margin, making a leasing decision.37  This lesser influence on the
number of acres leased leaves a large role for bureaucrats to use their discretion to dictate leasing
outcomes.
Counter to the BLM states hypothesis, the findings in Table 3a indicates that the
coefficient on SNRC is statistically significant and positive for the full sample, but is not
35 As a robustness check, given that the margin of influence for the political actors is largely on the probability of
leasing, I excluded states with minimal resources from the analysis to determine if the significance of the
coefficients on the political indicators was due to these states.  The states excluded are Idaho, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Washington. The results excluding these states were consistent, but the influence was diminished somewhat.  The
ideology coefficient on the SNRC was positive and statistically significant at almost the ten percent level for the
twelve state sample.  The coefficient on the political party of the legislative leadership measure was consistently
positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level.  The magnitude of both coefficients was smaller.  The
coefficient on the party of the legislative leadership decreased from 0.019 to approximately 0.012.
37 This margin of influence may also indicate that states that have significant resources and are consistently leasing
have diminished political influence.  As a robustness check, I analyzed the influence of the interaction of political
indicators and high resource states.  The results indicated that high resource states did receive diminished political
influence in some cases, for the SAC and SEPW committees, but the finding was not consistent across the other
political indicators.
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significant if the sample is restricted to the BLM states. 38,39  According to this hypothesis, the
unique political environment in the west as defined by Nelson (2000) should lead to stronger
federal influence in states that have a higher percentage of federal ownership.  Instead, in the
case of the SNRC chair the federal political influence is mitigated if only the BLM states are
analyzed.40  For the SNRC chair in the BLM states sample, the political influence is diminished
to ten percentage points and the statistical significance of the coefficient is lost.  These results are
not supported by the analysis of the interaction of politics and BLM states presented in Table 4.
38 This pattern is matched by the Senate Majority Leader as is shown in Table 7.
39 As a robustness check, in Table 4, I analyzed the full 16-state sample and included an interaction term to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the influence of politics between the BLM and non-
BLM states.  The findings indicate that the interaction variable is not statistically significant indicating that the
influence of politics is the same across both sample groups.  The effect of politics remains positive and statistically
significant.
40 This is supported by an analysis of the interactions between the political indicator and BLM lands presented in
column 1 of Table 4.
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Table 4: BLM States Interaction – All Political Variables (Tobit Random Effects)
Dependent
Variable:  BLM
Acres Leased per
Acre of BLM
Lands
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Ideology of
SNRC Chair
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Ideology of
SAC Chair
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Ideology of
SEPW
Committee
Chair
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Ideology of
Senate
Majority
Leader
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Ideology of U.S.
President
Ideology Score 0.0361* 0.0424* 0.0106 0.0418*** -0.0248*
Continuous (-1, 1) (1.889) (1.808) (0.745) (2.667) (-1.704)
BLM States -0.00886 -0.0116 -0.0113 -0.00851 -0.0194
(-0.324) (-0.425) (-0.417) (-0.310) (-0.709)
Interaction: BLM
State * Political
Indicator -0.0180 -0.0234 0.00176 -0.0297* 0.0396***
(-0.881) (-0.897) (0.114) (-1.746) (2.777)
U.S. Real Oil
Futures (Dollars
per Barrel) 0.000224 0.000211 0.000193 0.000208 0.000483
(0.472) (0.440) (0.377) (0.443) (1.017)
Post 1987 Indicator 0.0380*** 0.0306*** 0.0262** 0.0349*** 0.0267**
(3.074) (2.769) (2.401) (3.043) (2.444)
Post 1992 Indicator 0.00562 0.00624 0.00922 0.00227 0.0180
(0.536) (0.598) (0.890) (0.205) (1.591)
Post 2005
Indicator 0.0223 0.0226 0.0245 0.0231 0.0212
(1.164) (1.183) (1.256) (1.212) (1.054)
Time Trend 0.000111 0.000108 0.000108 0.000110 0.000110
(By State) (1.352) (1.320) (1.323) (1.330) (1.340)
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled
(Thousand Dollars) 6.05x10-6 4.43x10-6 3.61x10-6 5.65x10-6 -1.78x10-6
(0.567) (0.424) (0.341) (0.541) (-0.163)
Constant -0.0772** -0.0637* -0.0623 -0.0706* -0.0671*
(-2.052) (-1.681) (-1.625) (-1.870) (-1.782)
?u (State
specification
Variation) 0.0471*** 0.0471*** 0.0468*** 0.0473*** 0.0471***
(4.858) (4.856) (4.855) (4.861) (4.872)
?e (Observation
specific Variation) 0.0538*** 0.0538*** 0.0539*** 0.0535*** 0.0535***
(23.04) (23.05) (23.04) (23.06) (23.05)
Observations 400 400 400 400 400
Number of states 16 16 16 16 16
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component. ?u: panel-level standard deviation; ?e: standard deviation of e_it.
The comparison of BLM and non-BLM states indicates that the two groups are not
statistically significantly different, which also does not support the BLM states hypothesis.  The
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findings in Table 4 do support the previous conclusions regarding the statistically significant
influence of politics and the affect of conservative leadership, which leads to increased leasing.
Elected political influence on leasing outcomes is demonstrated across several political
measures and sample specifications.  This finding supports the existing literature (i.e. Weingast
and Moran, 1983) that finds that despite the discretion that bureaucrats enjoy and the potential
for principal-agent issues in managing bureaucracies, the elected political framework that the
BLM and DOI operate in does influence leasing outcomes.41  In addition, the statistically
significant role of the committee chair is confirmed for the SNRC and two additional
committees, supporting the work of Shepsle and Weingast (1987) who argue for a strong role for
committees in determining legislative outcomes.  The unexpected result regarding BLM states is
consistent across all legislative political variables, as I discuss below.
To further investigate political influence in Tables 5a and 5b, I analyzed the influence of
the Senate Appropriations Committee Chair (SAC).  The coefficient on SAC remains
consistently positive and statistically significant across both the full sample and the BLM states
sample.
41 To examine the separate influence of environmental special interest groups, the percentage of the state population
that is a member of the Sierra Club was also analyzed.  The variable was not consistently statistically significant.
Interestingly, it was positive which is counter to my expectation that increasing influence from environmental
groups would lead to decreases in leasing.  The coefficients on political and market variables remained consistent
with the results presented.  Future work will focus on examining the role of environmental special interest groups in
influencing leasing outcomes.
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Table 5a: Full Sample and BLM States Sample: Senate Committees
(Marginal Effects – Probability of Leasing)
Dependent Variable:
BLM Acres Leased
per Acre of BLM
Lands
Political Variable of Interest –
Ideology of Senate Appropriations
Committee Chair
Political Variable of Interest - Senate
Ideology of Environment and Public
Works Committee Chair
(1)
Full 16-State
Sample
(2)
11 BLM States
(3)
Full 16-State
Sample
(4)
11 BLM States
U.S. Real Oil Futures
(Dollars per Barrel) 0.00113 0.00154 0.00109 -0.000202
(0.422) (0.438) (0.383) (-0.0539)
Ideology Score
Committee Chair 0.152* 0.188* 0.0657 0.144**
Continuous (-1, 1) (1.826) (1.725) (1.297) (2.137)
Count of Regulatory
Changes by Year of
Implementation -0.00241 -0.00243 -0.00102 -0.000771
(-0.521) (-0.403) (-0.224) (-0.130)
Post 1987 Indicator 0.173*** 0.189** 0.145** 0.152**
(2.839) (2.456) (2.419) (1.989)
Post 1992 Indicator 0.0235 -0.0353 0.0473 -0.0432
(0.379) (-0.435) (0.789) (-0.551)
Post 2005  Indicator 0.126 -0.00560 0.135 0.0323
(1.206) (-0.0399) (1.282) (0.226)
Time Trend 0.000642 0.000635 0.000646 0.000630
(By State) (1.434) (1.552) (1.445) (1.537)
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled
(Thousand Dollars) 2.54x10-5 6.03x10-5 1.96x10-5 7.53x10-5
(0.437) (0.787) (0.333) (0.973)
? 0.436 0.305 0.434 0.305
Observations 400 275 400 275
Number of states 16 11 16 11
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component.
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Table 5b: Full Sample and BLM States Sample: Senate Committees
(Marginal Effects - Expected Increase in Acres Leased Given That Leasing Has Occurred)
Dependent Variable:
BLM Acres Leased
per Acre of BLM
Lands
Political Variable of Interest -
Senate Appropriations Committee
Chair
Political Variable of Interest - Senate
Environment and Public Works
Committee Chair
(1)
Full 16-State
Sample
(2)
11 BLM States
(3)
Full 16-State
Sample
(4)
11 BLM States
U.S. Real Oil Futures
(Dollars per Barrel) 7.19x10-5 7.42x10-5 6.98x10-5 -9.69x10-6
(0.422) (0.438) (0.383) (-0.0539)
Ideology Score
Committee Chair 0.00968* 0.00907* 0.00420 0.00692**
Continuous (-1, 1) (1.818) (1.719) (1.294) (2.125)
Count of Regulatory
Changes by Year of
Implementation -0.000154 -0.000117 -6.53x10-5 -3.70x10-5
(-0.520) (-0.402) (-0.224) (-0.130)
Post 1987 Indicator 0.0104*** 0.00862** 0.00884** 0.00698**
(2.910) (2.507) (2.486) (2.038)
Post 1992 Indicator 0.00149 -0.00171 0.00300 -0.00209
(0.380) (-0.432) (0.793) (-0.546)
Post 2005  Indicator 0.00876 -0.000269 0.00951 0.00158
(1.091) (-0.0400) (1.149) (0.221)
Time Trend 4.09x10-5 3.06x10-5 4.13x10-5 3.02x10-5
(By State) (1.428) (1.539) (1.439) (1.526)
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled
(Thousand Dollars) 1.62x10-6 2.90x10-6 1.25x10-6 3.61x10-6
(0.437) (0.785) (0.333) (0.970)
? 0.436 0.305 0.434 0.305
Observations 400 275 400 275
Number of states 16 11 16 11
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component.
For the full 16-state sample the marginal effect indicates that for a one standard deviation
increase in the SAC chair ideology score indicator, a move from a more moderate to a more
conservative ideology, the probability of leasing increases by four percentage points.  For the 11-
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state sample the increase is approximately five percentage points.42  The findings in Table 4
support these findings regarding the statistically significant influence of politics and the positive
affect of conservative leadership, leading to increased leasing.  The results regarding the BLM
states hypothesis, however, are once again not supported by the analysis of the interaction of
politics and BLM states presented in Table 4.  The comparison of BLM and non-BLM states
indicates that the two groups are not statistically significantly different.
As a final part of the committee ideology analysis, I analyzed the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee (SEPW).  Tables 5a and 5b show that the committee’s political
influence is strongest for the BLM states and not statistically significant for the full sample.  The
magnitude of the influence decreases by approximately half if the full sample is analyzed.  For
the 11-state sample the results indicate that for a one standard deviation increase in the SEPW
chair ideology score indicator, moving from a more moderate to a more conservative ideology,
there is a approximately six percentage point increase in the probability of leasing.43  These
findings are not robust to the analysis of BLM and non-BLM states that is presented in Table 4,
however.  The findings in Table 4 indicate that the political influence on the two groups is not
statistically significantly different.
Overall, my findings regarding legislative influence support the existing literature that
committee influence is important in determining bureaucratic outcomes, in this case oil and
natural gas leasing on BLM lands.  Secondly, the sign of the coefficient and its consistently
positive influence supports my hypothesis that more conservative leadership leads to additional
42 In the full sample, given that leasing has occurred, a one standard deviation increase in the ideology score
indicator, moving from a more moderate to a more conservative ideology, increases the expected number of acres
leased per acre of BLM  land by .2 percentage points, again a small impact.
43 In the BLM states sample, given that leasing has occurred, a one standard deviation increase in the ideology score
indicator, moving from a more moderate to a more conservative ideology, increases the expected number of acres
leased per acre of BLM  lands by 0.2 percentage points, again a small impact.
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leasing.  Also, the significance of the coefficient supports the work of Poole and Rosenthal (1991)
etc., who argue that political ideology matters in legislative outcomes.  In addition, the margin of
influence across all committees is largely focused on increasing the probability of leasing rather
than on increasing the number of acres leased.  This indicates that the dominant role of the
political framework is in increasing the probability that leasing occurs.  Lastly, there is a not a
clear distinction between the role of politics in BLM states and the other states, indicating the for
the Senate Committee Chairs, the BLM states hypothesis does not hold.
To investigate the role of the federal legislature further, I have also examined the
influence of the Senate Majority Leader.  For this political variable the findings in Table 7
indicate that the role of politics is mitigated rather than enhanced in BLM states.  For the Senate
Majority Leader, the magnitude of the influence on the probability of leasing for a one standard
deviation increase in the ideology score indicator differs by only one percentage point between
the 16-state and BLM states samples.  It decreases from approximately five percentage points in
the 16-state sample to four statistically insignificant percentage points in the BLM states sample.
The influence is diminished in the BLM states in direct contrast with the BLM states hypothesis.
These findings are robust to the analysis of BLM and non-BLM states that is presented in Table
4.  The results in Table 4 show that BLM states have significantly less political influence than
non-BLM states.  To further explore the role of the Senate Committees and Senate Majority
Leader, I have also analyzed the political party of the relevant actors.
BLM States – The role of the U.S. Senate and Political Party
I expected that the role of ideology would prove to be more significant because the
measure describes in more detail the political identity of each individual.  This proved to be
particularly true when identifying the potentially disparate influence of the Senate Committee
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Chairs and Senate Majority Leader.  Over this time frame, the political party changes were
identical so it is not possible to separately identify the influence of the political party of the
committee chairs and Senate Majority Leader on leasing.  In Table 6, I present the results of the
analysis of the influence of the political party of the Senate leaders.  The findings indicate that
more conservative leadership leads to additional leasing.
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Table 6: Full Sample and BLM States Sample: Political Party of Senate Majority Leader
and U.S. President (Tobit Random Effects)
Dependent
Variable:  BLM
Acres Leased per
Acre of BLM
Lands
Political Variable of
Interest – Political Party
of Senate Majority
Leadera
Political Variable of
Interest – Political Party
of U.S. President
(1)
Full 16-
State
Sample
(2)
11 BLM
States
(3)
Full 16-
State
Sample
(4)
11 BLM
States
U.S. Real Oil
Futures (Dollars
per Barrel) 6.20x10-5 0.000268 2.29x10-5 -0.000124
(0.183) (0.789) (0.0582) (-0.322)
Political Party 0.0190** 0.0105 0.00757 0.0232**
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat) (2.554) (1.424) (0.767) (2.395)
Count of
Regulatory
Changes by Year
of Implementation -0.000215 -9.79x10-5 -0.000112 -3.58x10-5
(-0.262) (-0.120) (-0.136) (-0.0444)
Post 1987
Indicator 0.0379*** 0.0284** 0.0221** 0.0158
(3.146) (2.382) (2.024) (1.479)
Post 1992
Indicator 0.00230 0.000245 0.0207* 0.0222**
(0.229) (0.0247) (1.957) (2.149)
Post 2005
Indicator 0.0310* 0.00637 0.0208 0.00414
(1.836) (0.377) (1.256) (0.254)
Time Trend 0.000111 8.29x10-5 0.000110 7.92x10-5
(By State) (1.399) (1.566) (1.385) (1.497)
Constant -0.0797*** -0.0616*** -0.0708** -0.0616***
(-2.834) (-2.892) (-2.535) (-2.941)
?u (State specific
standard
deviation) 0.0470*** 0.0285*** 0.0470*** 0.0285***
(4.974) (3.776) (4.965) (3.784)
?e(Observation
specific standard
deviation) 0.0539*** 0.0455*** 0.0544*** 0.0452***
(23.47) (19.69) (23.47) (19.72)
? .431 .281 0.427 .284
Observations 416 286 416 286
Number of states 16 11 16 11
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component.
a: Political party changes were the same for the Senate Majority Leader and all three committee chairs.
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The results for the party of the Senate Majority Leader follow the pattern of the Senate
Majority Leader’s ideology in that for the BLM states sample there is not a statistically
significant influence from the leadership’s political party, while there is in the full sample.  In the
full sample, a one unit increase in the indicator, from Democrat to Republican, leads to an
approximately 11 percentage point increase in the probability of leasing.  For the BLM states
sample, a one unit increase leads to a statistically insignificant eight percentage point increase.
While the results are higher for the full sample, in contrast with the BLM states hypothesis, they
do demonstrate the continued strength of the three of the previous results;  the significant role of
committee chairs, the positive influence of more conservative leadership on leasing, and the
margin on which the political influence operates, namely in increasing the probability of leasing.
Further, these results support the existing literature that argues for the importance of parties in
determining political outcomes, in this case not simply Congressional behavior, but bureaucratic
outcomes as well.  To expand the analysis beyond the federal legislature, I also examined the
role of the executive branch.
BLM States – The role of the U.S. President and Ideology
Results for the ideology score of the President are presented in Table 7.  The findings
indicate that like the SAC and SEPW the role of the President is more dominant in the BLM
states.
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Table 7: Full Sample and BLM States Sample: Senate Majority Leader and U.S. President
(Tobit Random Effects)
Dependent Variable:
BLM Acres Leased
per Acre of BLM
Lands
Political Variable of Interest –
Ideology of Senate Majority
Leader
Political Variable of Interest –
Ideology of U.S. President
(1)
Full 16-State
Sample
(2)
11 BLM States
(3)
Full 16-State
Sample
(4)
11 BLM States
U.S. Real Oil Futures
(Dollars per Barrel) 0.000109 0.000293 2.33x10-5 -0.000121
(0.323) (0.868) (0.0595) (-0.316)
Ideology Score 0.0233** 0.0134 0.00733 0.0224**
Continuous (-1, 1) (2.514) (1.459) (0.769) (2.395)
Count of Regulatory
Changes by Year of
Implementation -0.000258 -0.000125 -0.000125 -7.42x10-5
(-0.314) (-0.153) (-0.151) (-0.0921)
Post 1987 Indicator 0.0355*** 0.0274** 0.0224** 0.0166
(3.045) (2.369) (2.058) (1.562)
Post 1992 Indicator 0.00255 8.21x10-5 0.0197** 0.0190**
(0.254) (0.00827) (1.999) (1.977)
Post 2005  Indicator 0.0300* 0.00603 0.0208 0.00406
(1.784) (0.358) (1.255) (0.249)
Time Trend 0.000110 8.27x10-5 0.000110 7.92x10-5
(By State) (1.389) (1.562) (1.385) (1.497)
Constant -0.0697** -0.0562*** -0.0668** -0.0494**
(-2.510) (-2.690) (-2.383) (-2.361)
?u (State specific
standard deviation) 0.0470*** 0.0285*** 0.0470*** 0.0285***
(4.974) (3.777) (4.965) (3.784)
?e(Observation
specific standard
deviation) 0.0539*** 0.0455*** 0.0544*** 0.0452***
(23.47) (19.69) (23.47) (19.72)
? .431 .281 .427 .284
Observations 400 286 400 286
Number of states 16 11 16 11
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component. ?u: panel-level standard deviation; ?e: standard deviation of e_it.
The results for the U.S. President, however, are robust to the analysis presented in Table
4 comparing BLM states and non-BLM states.44  Table 7 shows once again that more
44 The initial negative sign on the U.S. President in Table 4 is not due to the inclusion of the interaction terms, but
the inclusion of the well cost variable.  This negative coefficient is unexpected, but significant at only the 10 percent
level. It indicates that for non-BLM states more liberal executive leadership leads to additional leasing. The negative
sign is not robust to other specifications.
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conservative leadership leads to additional leasing.  The magnitude of the influence of the
President is five percentage points higher in the BLM states sample, a marked increase.  In the
BLM states sample, a one standard deviation increase in the political indicator, moving from a
more moderate to a more conservative ideology, leads to an approximately seven percentage
point increase in the probability of leasing.  For the full sample, the increase is only two
statistically insignificant percentage points.  These findings support the BLM states hypothesis
and demonstrate that at the executive level, the amount of federal lands in a state do matter.  The
pattern of results is consistent if the political party of the U.S. President is analyzed.  The
political influence is positive and statistically significant for the BLM states, but not for the full
sample. (See Table 6)45
In addition to demonstrating Presidential influence on leasing, the results are also an
indicator of the influence of the DOI and the BLM.  Through the appointment of the Secretary of
the Interior, the President influences the political environment at the DOI.  Appointments of
BLM directors extend this influence to the BLM.  Therefore, the more dominant influence of the
executive office in the BLM states is an indication of a stronger bureaucratic influence as well.
Regulatory Framework
To investigate the role of regulation on leasing, three time period indicators were used to
represent the three periods of significant regulatory change.  The year 1987 proved to be of
particular importance in influencing the acres of competitive leases that were issued.  This is not
surprising given that the regulation required that all leases be issued competitively prior to being
offered as non-competitive leases.  This regulatory change was the largest in terms of the number
of changes and additions to the code of federal register for competitive leasing and dictated that
45 The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that for a one unit increase in the political party indicator, from
Democrat to Republican, the probability of leasing increases by 17 percentage points.
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all leases were required to be issued competitively prior to their issuance as noncompetitive
leases.46  The graphically demonstrated increase in leases that occurred in part due to this
regulation, see Figure 5, was reinforced by the empirical analysis.  There is a consistently
positive and statistically significant increase in acres of competitive leases issued per BLM acre
in 1987.  In Table 5a, the results indicate that after the regulation was put in place there was
between a 15 and 20 percentage point increase in the probability of competitive leasing.  In
addition, Table 5b demonstrates that given that competitive leasing has occurred, after the
regulation was put in place, the expected number of acres leased per acre of BLM  lands
increased by between approximately 0.7 and one percentage points.  Clearly, this was a
significant regulatory intervention in terms of competitive lease issuance.  The subsequent
Energy Policy Acts in 1992 and 2005 had much less influence on leasing.  The 2005 Act was in
some cases significant, but not consistently.  Also, the 1992 Act was significant only when
analyzing the role of the President.
In all cases where regulatory changes influenced leasing, the effect was positive.  This
finding seems to be counter to the hypothesis that regulation increases leasing costs and therefore
decreases leasing.  It should be noted however that particularly in the case of the 1987 regulation,
it was designed to increase competitive leasing and so its effect on leasing costs was muted by
the design of the regulation.  If noncompetitive leases are analyzed, the effect of the 1987
regulation on leasing is negative.  Also, importantly, if all leases are analyzed together, the effect
of the 1987 regulation was also negative.  Table 8 shows that  after the regulation was put in
place there was an approximately 25 percentage point decrease in the probability of leasing for
46 “The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is the codification of the general and permanent rules published in the
Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government.” (CFR, Main Page)
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the full sample.  This supports the hypothesis that for leasing generally, increases in regulation
do negatively influence leasing.  The 1992 and 2005 Acts are not significant, however.
Table 8: Noncompetitive Leases and Both Competitive and Noncompetitive Leases
(Marginal Effects – Probability of Leasing)
Dependent Variable:
BLM Acres Leased
per Acre of BLM
Lands
Political Variable of Interest –
Ideology of Senate Natural
Resources Committee Chair
(1)
Noncompetitive
Leases
(2)
Both Competitive
and
Noncompetitive
Leases
U.S. Real Oil Futures
(Dollars per Barrel) -1.17x10-5 -0.000161
(-0.0126) (-0.176)
Ideology Score 0.00484 0.0303
Continuous (-1, 1) (0.200) (1.254)
Count of Regulatory
Changes by Year of
Implementation 0.00314** 0.00303*
(2.050) (1.956)
Post 1987 Indicator -0.136*** -0.108***
(-5.714) (-4.532)
Post 1992 Indicator -0.0174 -0.0121
(-0.813) (-0.565)
Post 2005  Indicator -0.0114 0.00551
(-0.285) (0.140)
Time Trend 0.000125 0.000212
(By State) (1.016) (1.485)
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled
(Thousand Dollars) -3.44x10-6 1.59x10-5
(-0.155) (0.739)
Constant 0.0946** 0.0601
(2.001) (1.156)
? .295 0.358
Observations 400 400
Number of states 16 16
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component.
Prices and Market Factors
In addition to political ideology measures, Table 4 shows that price and well costs are not
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significant for both samples.47  If the joint significance of well costs and futures prices are
analyzed they are also found to be jointly insignificant.48,49  The lack of significance in the price
results, both historical prices and futures prices, could be due to the fact that producers are basing
their leasing decisions on prices much farther in the future.  The futures prices used in the
analysis are based on months in the future while leases issued currently will not be producing
until approximately one to three years in the future.  Also, as noted by Paddock, Siegel, and
Smith (1988), the process of production has a high level of uncertainty in market factors other
than resource price.  The authors argue that across the three stages of production; exploration,
development, and extraction, there are several factors that affect the valuation of a lease.  In
addition to uncertainty in future resource prices, these include uncertainty in resources,
development and exploration costs, expected extraction rates, and expected tax structures.
(Paddock, Siegel, and Smith 1988, p.483-485) In the future, other market factors may be
analyzed to investigate the role of the market further, however, for this chapter the focus is on
the political determinants.
In addition to price and well cost, the state time trend is generally positive but proves to
be consistently statistically insignificant across samples.  The linear time trend was included to
measure the overall influence of each year in the sample.  It also serves as an indicator of
technological progress.50  In the future, alternative measures of technological progress will  be
utilized to more fully examine the role that technological changes have had on leasing.
47 The findings regarding well costs are consistently insignificant across specifications using all political variables.
48 The findings are consistent across the three-year moving average of oil prices and natural gas prices as well.  The
price and well costs measures are not jointly significant.
49 If prices and well costs are tested in conjunction with the 2005 indicator variable the three measures are jointly
significant.  The regulatory indicator is a coarse measure with which to identify regulatory change.  It also identifies
a time period of significant price and leasing increases.  Although the price, well cost, and the regulatory measure
are not individually or pair wise significant.  The joint significance and positive sign of the coefficient does indicate
that the market factors are influencing leasing.
50 The results were consistent if a linear time trend across states was used.  Also, the findings regarding political
influence are not significantly affected if a year random effects model is used.
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Lastly, ?, a measure of the percentage of the total variation in acres of competitive leases
issued per acre of BLM lands that is due to persistent state characteristics is markedly different
between the two samples.  In the 16-state sample, the percentage of variation in leasing that is
due to persistent state characteristics is approximately 40 percent while for the 11-state sample it
is approximately 30 percent.  This indicates that the 16-state sample is more heterogeneous than
the 11-state sample.  This finding supports the hypothesis that the BLM states are more
homogeneous.51  Since the federal political influence is not consistently significantly different in
the BLM states, however, this finding does not support the hypothesis that the BLM states are
more homogeneous due to a unique federal political environment.
Conclusions and Future Work
The results indicate that the role of federal elected political influence in determining oil
and natural gas leasing outcomes on BLM lands is as hypothesized in three ways, but the
findings are mixed with regards to the dominant role of politics that I expected in the BLM
states.  First, the ideology and party of the committee chairs, Senate Majority Leader, and U.S.
President did influence leasing, demonstrating that the elected political framework does affect
bureaucratic outcomes at the BLM.  The influential role of the elected political leadership
supports the existing literature which argues that bureaucrats are constrained in their behavior by
the political environment in which they operate (i.e. Weingast and Moran, 1983).  Additionally,
the findings support arguments put forward in other papers regarding the important role that
political party, ideology, and committee membership play in influencing outcomes, in this case
bureaucratic rather than Congressional outcomes. (Levy, 2004; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991;
Shepsle and Weingast, 1987) Second, this influence was positive across all measures indicating
51 The percentage of variation due to persistent state affects also captures other economic, geographic, and political
characteristics of each state.
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that more conservative elected political influence does lead to increases in leasing.  Lastly, the
margin of influence was the same.  Elected political influence affects the probability of leasing
and has little influence on the number of acres leased per acre of BLM lands.
The expected dominance of the federal political influence for the BLM states relative to
the full 16 state sample was robustly demonstrated for the office of the U.S. President, but it was
not found in the legislative leadership.  This indicates that the expected role of the federal
government in the westernmost states in the United States is not consistent across political
offices.  The argument put forward by Nelson (2000) regarding the unique political environment
in the west is not supported in terms of oil and gas leasing at the legislative level but it is at the
executive level.  Given the appointment power of the U.S. President over the DOI Secretary and
BLM Director, the dominant role of the political influence of the U.S. President in the BLM
states indicates that bureaucratic influence is stronger in these states as well.
The market influence, particularly as measured in terms of short term futures prices and
historic prices was not significant.  The lack of significance in the price results, both historical
prices and futures prices, could be due to the fact that producers are basing their leasing
decisions on prices much farther in the future.  As  Paddock, Siegel, and Smith (1988) noted, the
three stages of the development process have uncertainties in various factors including expected
price.  Future work will focus on identifying additional futures prices that may more strongly
influence the leasing decision.  Finally, regulation, particularly the passage of FOOGLRA in
1987, played a key role in influencing competitive leasing outcomes and leasing outcomes
generally.
Forthcoming work will examine in more detail the role of state delegations and the
potentially disparate influence of committee leadership based on the state of origin of the leader.
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In the future, I plan to investigate further the role of the DOI and BLM and their influence on
leasing outcomes in the West.  It is important to note that the political findings describe the
influence of elected political actors and not all political influence.  The small influence on the
number of acres leased leaves a large role for bureaucrats to use their discretion to dictate leasing
outcomes.52  A more detailed analysis of the bureaucratic influence on leasing is left for future
work.
52 The pseudo R-squared results indicate that elected political and market influence explain between 4 and 8 percent
of the overall variation in acres leased per acre of BLM lands.  I expect that some of the remaining variation in
leasing is due to bureaucratic shifts over time.
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CHAPTER 3
Prices or Politics?
The Influence of Markets and Political Party Changes on Oil and Gas
Development in the United States
50
Energy Ideology
Republican:  “If we are to have the resources we need to achieve
energy independence, we simply must draw more American oil
from American soil. (RNC)
Democratic:  “We must end the tyranny of oil in our time.” (DNC)
Introduction
Fossil fuel development, in particular oil and natural gas development are contentious
issues in the United States.  The debate over how to meet the nation’s energy demands and the
role of domestic production in meeting these demands is a prominent topic in state and federal
politics and is entrenched in a perceived partisan divide.  The conventional wisdom has been that
Republicans, motivated by their pro-business ideology, push for growth while Democrats,
concerned about the environment, seek less development.  As prices for oil and natural gas
resources increased, the rhetoric on both sides of the development debate heated up.
 Homeowners who lack mineral rights have felt trampled as oil and natural gas wells
sprouted up in their backyards for the benefit of the mineral rights owner, while states have
benefited through job growth, increased tax revenues, and rising GDP.  The development has
also become a major contributor to local economic growth in regions with resource reserves, but
has been criticized by environmentalists and some local politicians who’ve felt that it
compromised wilderness areas and the rights of surface owners.  This chapter delves into this
conflict in an attempt to determine if the states’ political parties have chosen sides in this
development contest or whether it was simply economic and geologic factors at play in a market
determined largely by resource prices.
As I stated in Chapter 2, the conventional wisdom is that in politics, party matters,
although in the literature, the findings regarding political party vary. (See Chapter 2 for a
discussion of the literature).  This chapter delves into the debate by including measures of
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political party for various salient political actors, including the leadership of the federal and state
legislatures and executive offices.
I expect the saliency of the issue and the degree of divergence of the parties’ ideologies to
be key factors in determining if party influence will lead to quantifiable changes in outcomes.
For this analysis, I will analyze a highly salient issue, oil and natural gas development, with a
perceived strong ideological divide between parties.  Given the platforms of the Republican and
Democratic parties quoted above, one would expect pro-oil and gas development policies under a
Republican administration and reduced oil and gas development under a Democratic
administration relative.  In this analysis, I focus specifically on whether or not the political party
of the executive and legislative leaders matters in determining the number of oil and natural gas
drilling permits issued by each states’ oil and gas commissions.53
Several papers have examined the degree of influence that a political leader has on
federal legislative and bureaucratic outcomes. (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the literature))
This literature has provided analyses of the role of various federal bureaucracies, but has not
provided an evaluation of the roles of political and bureaucratic influence in permitting at the
state level.  Gerber and Teske (200) review the literature on state level political and bureaucratic
analysis.  They point out that while there have been some studies that specifically focused on
state bureaucratic outcomes, Wood (1991), the literature at the state level is not as robust as it is
at the federal level.  This chapter does not directly measure the relationship between bureaucrats
and elected political leaders and instead focuses on the role of federal and state elected political
leadership and the influence that political party changes have on permitting changes through
their influence on the overall political framework.
53 A permit is short for an application for a permit to drill (APD).  See the Background Section below for a
discussion of the history and process of permitting.
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In general, the analysis in this chapter focuses on drilling permits issued at the state level
over the time period from the 1977 through 2007.  The time period focuses on two periods of
increased development, the 1980s and the years around 2006, which was a peak year for
development.   The time period under analysis provides a rich background with which to analyze
permit changes.  During this thirty year period prices have fluctuated significantly and the
regulations regarding those prices, particularly for natural gas have evolved.  This time frame
captures the complexity of the oil and natural gas market, its booms and busts.
Background
State Oil and Gas Resources
  Each state has a unique natural resource endowment, regulatory environment, and
amount of development in terms of each resource.  To shed light on how the states may
differentially contribute to the overall analysis, I  provide a brief overview of each state’s oil and
gas resources in Table 9.
Table 9: Oil and Natural Gas Resources by State
State Oil Resources Natural Gas Resources
Alabama ? Minimal onshore oil production ? 1% of total U.S. production
Alaska ? Largest oil field in the U.S.
? Second largest oil producer
? 5 of the top 100 natural gas fields in the
U.S.
Arizona ? Minimal oil production ? Minimal natural gas production
Arkansas ? Minimal oil production ? 1% of total U.S. production
California ? Third largest crude oil reserves in the
U.S.
? 10% of total U.S. annual production on
average
? Less than 2% of total U.S. production
Colorado ? 3 of the top 100 oil fields in the U.S.
? 1% of total U.S. annual production on
average
? 10 of the top 100 natural gas fields in
the U.S.
? 5% of total U.S. annual production on
average
Florida ? Minimal onshore oil resources
? Historically, 8th in production in the late
1970s
? Minimal natural gas production
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State Oil Resources Natural Gas Resources
Illinois ? Minimal oil production
? Historically, top oil producing state until
1970
? Minimal natural gas production
Indiana ? Minimal oil production ? Minimal natural gas production
Louisiana ? Fourth in onshore oil production behind
Texas, Alaska, and California
? Historically, production peaked in 1970
? Fifth in natural gas production
excluding OCS production
? Historically, production peaked in
1970
Michigan ? Minimal oil production ? Natural gas production meets 30 %
of state demand
? More reserves than any other state in
the Great Lakes Region
Montana ? 2 of the top 100 oil fields in the U.S.
? 2% of total U.S. annual production on
average
? Minimal production
New Mexico ? 3% of total U.S. annual production on
average
? 10% of total U.S. annual production
on average
New York ? No oil production ? Minimal natural gas production
Oklahoma ? 2 of the top 100  oil fields in the U.S.
? 3% of total U.S. annual production on
average
? 12 of the top 100 natural gas fields in
the U.S.
? 10% of total U.S. annual production
on average
Pennsylvania ? No oil production ? Minimal natural gas production
Texas ? 20 of the top 100 oil fields in the U.S.
? 1/4 of U.S. oil reserves
? 1/3 of U.S. natural gas reserves
? 1/3 of U.S. natural gas annual
production on average
Utah ? 4 of the top 100 oil fields in the U.S.
? 1% of total U.S. annual production on
average
? 2 of the top 100 natural gas fields in
the U.S.
? 2% of total U.S. annual production
on average
Wyoming ? 3% of total U.S. annual production on
average
? 10% of total U.S. annual production
on average
Source: EIA, State Energy Profiles
While I expect that there will be some political influence on oil and gas development in all states,
I believe that the role of politics will vary along with the variation in natural resource endowment.
This broad sample allows for an examination of the role of political influence across disparate
political and natural environments and benefits the applicability of this analysis to various
regions in the United States.
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Permit Process
With the advent of significant oil and gas development, typically around the 1950s, states
set up a regulatory commissions charged with permitting oil and gas drilling within each state.
The mission of each commission is to promote responsible development and ensure the efficient
use of resources.  This focus stems from the fact that the agencies were founded to address
concerns over wasteful development practices.  While the focus of the commissions is not
primarily on environmental conservation, the missions address responsible development in their
charters which typically includes a focus on public safety and environmental protection.  In
terms of state political influence, each commission is primarily responsible to their respective
governor’s office which appoints board members and influenced by the state’s legislature
through the approval of board members, budgeting, and legislation in regards to oil and gas
development.  The commissions are also indirectly influenced by the federal political climate
because oil and gas development occurs on federal lands within states.  The Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) is largely responsible for this development and they are influenced by the
President who appoints the BLM leadership and by the federal legislature through budgeting and
the federal legislation in regards to oil and gas development.
For each oil or natural gas well drilled in a state whether it is exploratory or development,
on federal, state or private lands, the state’s oil and gas commission requires a permit.  The
permit provides the producer with the ability to drill in the designated location abiding by any
state restrictions regarding drilling methods.  The permits typically require that drilling begin
within 6 months to a year from the issue date and expire if not used. For approval, each permit
must go through an application and approval process.  The application requires detailed
information about the location and type of well to be drilled.  The approval process is not time
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consuming and available data shows that it typically can be completed in five to thirty days. 54
The chapter includes a sample permit for the state of Colorado in Appendix B that shows the
typical types of information that the commissions require for approval.  There is a high degree of
technical detail required, but since the permits are typically applied for by established oil and
natural gas producers this is not normally a hurdle to development.  In addition, there is usually a
small application fee and a bond requirement to ensure that responsible drilling procedures are
followed.  Historically across all states, the commissions have acted as de facto rubber stamps
for permitting.  For example, Colorado has denied two permits in the last ten years while New
Mexico has not denied a permit.  Generally, the number of permits issued is approximately
equivalent to the number demanded.
In any discussion of oil and gas permitting, a consideration of the different types of land
ownership in each state is critical.  In particular, it must be noted that oil and gas wells drilled on
federal lands  require a permit from the relevant federal agency, often the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) in addition to the permit from the state’s oil and gas commission.55
Commissions have a clear bureaucratic mission of permit approval, but this may be mandated in
cases where the drilling is occurring on federal land.56  Across all land types the penchant for
permit approval at the commissions could be strongly influenced by the federal process of permit
approval especially in cases where a large number of the overall permits issued in the state are
issued on federal lands, dictating the mission of the commissions and rendering them as rubber-
stamps for approval.  It may also be the case that given the federal approval, the state has no
legitimate reason to deny the permit given the similarity in their regulations regarding permit
54 Delays in permitting have recently increased permitting time in Colorado to almost 60 days, but in other states
such as Wyoming and New Mexico approval can be received in as little as 5 days.
55 For a complete discussion of the role of the BLM in oil and gas development, see Chapter 1.
56 There were no cases found where the federal government approved a permit on federal land, but the permit was
denied by the state.  The dominance of the federal permitting process could be at play.
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approval.  To address federal political influence, I will analyze the role of the political party of
the Congressional leadership and the President.  I will not directly analyze the mechanisms that
have dictated the approval process of the oil and gas commissions, instead taking this as given.
Due to the difference in the political and regulatory environment for oil and natural gas
development on federal lands, I analyze federal lands development in a separate chapter.57
Political Influence
The literature on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats focuses on
identifying if and when the preferred policies of the principal, the politician, are in fact instituted
by the bureaucracy, the agent.  Weingast and Moran (1983) is the seminal paper with regards to
the interactions between the legislature and the bureaucracies that they manage.  They find that
despite the fact that the federal legislature does not closely monitor the day to day activities of
the bureaucratic agencies that they manage, they do in fact control their agenda.  This is done
largely through credible threats to limit or remove funding and to not approve those who are
appointed to run these government agencies. (Weingast and Moran, 1983)  Shipan (2004)
expands on the arguments of Weingast and Moran (1983) by examining not only if legislatures
might influence bureaucracies, but also when.  He argues that it is not legislation that matters in
determining bureaucratic agency outcomes, but the potential for that legislation.  This chapter
leverages this argument for control of bureaucracies through indirect measures.  Rather than
focusing on a specific mechanism such as legislation and its effects on the number of permits
issued by the commissions, I analyze the overall impact of changes in the party leadership of the
legislatures.  The mechanism of influence could be legislation, threat of legislation, limits on
funding, or in the case of the state legislatures, lack of approval for board members appointed by
the Governor.
57 See Chapter 1.
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The gubernatorial and Presidential analyses focus solely on the influence of the state and
federal executive branches on permitting levels leveraging the work of Wood (1988) and Wood
and Waterman (1991) who focused their analysis on the potential influence of the President on
federal bureaucracies.  Wood (1988) demonstrated that the EPA, which was an independent
bureaucracy, could mitigate executive influence.  He argued that clear legal mandates that
limited bureaucratic options were in part responsible for the independence of the bureaucracy.
The EPA was legally bound with specific enforcement rules which dictated their day to day
behavior and therefore the role of the President’s influence was limited.  In this context the oil
and gas commissions could also be perceived to be independent of executive influence due to
their limited bureaucratic option.  One could argue that the commissions simply approve permits
so the number of permits issued by the bureaucracy equals the number demanded regardless of
the political influence.  This argument only holds, however, under the assumption that politicians
could not influence the permitting process and alter the approval rate for permitting or alter the
process of approval to decrease demand for permits.  In this chapter, I make no such assumptions.
The power of politicians to alter the approval process was recently demonstrated in
Colorado with the passage of new legislation requiring additional protections for wildlife among
other considerations for all future permits.  The oil and gas industry was quite clear in their
opposition to this legislation arguing that they would simply drill in other states, thereby
decreasing demand for permits in Colorado.  In addition, simple changes such as increasing or
decreasing fees for permitting can alter demand.  These examples demonstrate that there are
several mechanisms by which politicians can influence permitting levels.  Land type may be a
determining factor in terms of independence and the ability of state politicians to decrease
demand for permits, particularly on federal lands which are clearly more independently managed
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than non-federal lands.  The Colorado example above does demonstrate, though, that statewide
legal changes will have implications across land type.  A demonstration of federal political
influence on permitting is contained in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.  This Act specifically
focused on simplifying the permitting process to increase oil and gas development.
In contrast to the independence of the EPA, Wood and Waterman (1991) showed that
there were measurable executive level impacts on outcomes for various other federal
bureaucracies.  They find that political appointments are the most important source of political
control.  While other legislative methods of influence including budget limitations and
legislation were less effective.  Overall their results indicate that bureaucracies respond to
external political pressure.  In this analysis, I am able to test the effect of political appointments
at the commissions and BLM only indirectly by analyzing political changes in the office of the
state governors and President.  Once again, the specific mechanism of political influence on the
bureaucracy is not the focus of this analysis.  Instead, this chapter examines whether the public
perception of party influence is correct.
Oil and Gas Regulations
Given that this chapter focuses on the role of market factors particularly resource prices
in determining permit levels, changes in price regulations must be considered.  Oil prices are set
largely by the world market, while natural gas prices have been highly regulated over their
history.  The relaxing of natural gas regulations began in the late 1970s, but it was not until the
early 1990s that the market determined natural gas prices. (History, Natural gas.org) The Natural
Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978 was enacted to mitigate the negative impacts of the previous
regulatory regime, which was leading to natural gas shortages. (History, Natural Gas) The
purpose of this act was to establish a national gas market where prices of natural gas would be
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dictated by market forces thereby eliminating the gas shortages. (History, Natural Gas) This goal
of deregulation was not fully achieved however until the passage of the Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act of 1989.  This act dictated that by 1993 “all remaining NGPA price regulations
were to be eliminated, allowing the market to completely determine the price of natural gas at the
wellhead.” (History, Natural Gas) I analyzed the independent impacts of this changing regulation
and present the results in the empirical section.  I identified the key years 1989 and 1993
individually to determine if they independently impacted permit levels.58
In addition to changes in the regulatory environment regarding oil and natural gas pricing,
there have been changes in federal regulations regarding oil and gas development that must be
considered. After the 1970’s, the oil and gas development landscape was shaped by three major
regulatory changes.  The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 (FOOGLRA)
and the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 and 2005.  The 1987 Act made significant changes to federal
leasing regulations.  This act amended the leasing act of 1920, which led to changes in the
definition of leasing types and gave the Forest Service the authority to dictate leasing on their
lands, among other changes.  Given that a great deal of oil and gas permitting occurs on federal
lands, I expect there to be a measurable influence from FOOGLRA.  Also, the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 included tax incentives for oil and natural gas development and was designed to increase
domestic oil production and streamline the permitting process for development. (SNRC, Impacts)
I expect this regulation to lead to increases in permitting.  To motivate the empirical analysis of
market, regulatory, and political factors,  I present a theoretical framework below.
58 Since the regulations beginning in 1978 cover the entire sample time period, there is not a significant amount of
variation for analysis.  It is assumed that this regulation change influenced the entire sample and it’s not analyzed
separately.
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Theoretical Framework
The focus of the theoretical framework is to incorporate political indicators and market
measures to determine their influence on permitting. The theoretical framework is based on the
standard economic supply and demand model.  In this case, however, the supply side is
determined primarily by elected officials who issue permits, while the demand side is determined
by profit-maximizing oil and gas producers who base their demand for permits on relevant
market factors.
Politics and Federal Leasing: Supply
The political actors have three possible avenues of influence on the supply of permits:
direct influence on the number of permits offered, Mi, indirect influence of state actors on
permitting through regulations on permitting, Rmi, and indirect influence of federal political
actors on oil and gas development through federal regulations, Ry.
Mi = f(Si, Z, li) (1)
The number of permits issued, Mi, is a function of the political affiliation of a set of relevant state
political actors, Si, relevant federal political actors, Z, and the available resources for
development, li.59  The state political actors influence permitting through their influence over the
state commissions, while the federal political actors influence permitting through their influence
on federal lands through the BLM.  The number of permits issued varies by state, i, and depends
positively on the amount of resources available in each state.  Specifically, li is a continuous
measure from 0 to Li of the oil and natural gas resources in each state.
In addition to the direct influence of Si and Z on Mi, they influence development through
regulations such that
h(Si) = ( Rmi) (2)
59 Z is not indexed by state because the federal political actors do not vary by state.
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 h(Z) = ( Ry) (3)
A more liberal ideology is expected to lead to additional regulation.60  Specifically, for both
permitting and development regulations, it is expected that decreases in Si or Z will lead to
additional regulations.
Si, Z = 0 if Democrat and 1 if Republican (4)
Si and  Zi are binary variables indicating political party affiliation.61
Oil and Gas Producers: Demand
Firms use the existing level of technology to produce the profit maximizing level of oil
and natural gas.  For the j-th producer:
qj = g(xj,yj) (4)
The production of oil and natural gas is determined by a uniform production function that varies
across firms by the permits that it has, xj, and its input choice for the second composite input,
yj.62  For the j-th profit maximizing producer:
?? = pg(x?, y?)	– ?w? + R?? + R??x? +	(w? + R?? + R?)y?	 (5)
Input costs for permitting and development, wm and wy, are increasing with increasing regulation.
The permits are allocated in such a way that producer j acquires some number of permits J ? N,
where N is the total permits issued.  Solving the standard profit maximizing model leads to some
important implications regarding the role of input costs and prices.  It can be shown that:
Permitting:
???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0, ???
????
< 0, ???	 ???
???
< 0
60 In the theoretical model, regulations are defined to include environmental, health, and safety regulations that add
to operating costs and therefore lead to decreases in development.  The converse to these types of regulations are
regulations that are designed to lead to increased development, such as the Energy Policy Act of 2005.  I expect
regulations that lead to decreases in operating costs will lead to additional leasing and will be more prominent in
Republican regimes.
61 Party affiliation for each political actor does not vary over time.
62 The second composite good represents all other inputs into resource production including development inputs
such as drilling capital and labor.
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Composite development good:
???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0,					 ???
???
< 0,???	 ???
????
< 0
Permitting will decrease as permitting costs increase and as regulations increase.  The influence
of development costs is not clear in this case.  A similar case is found for the composite
development good.  In addition, it can be shown that in terms of prices, an increase in oil and/or
natural gas price will lead to either an increase in permits or an increase in development or both,
but the specific influence is not known given the standard profit maximization assumptions.  The
next section presents the data set that I constructed to test these theoretical implications, followed
by the empirical results.
Data
The sample states for this analysis are made up of a subset of member states of the
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC).  This multi-state government agency is
tasked with representing states’ oil and natural gas interests.  The IOGCC currently has 30
member states and of these I included those with significant oil and gas interests whose oil and
gas commissions responded to my inquiry regarding oil and natural gas drilling permits in the
sample.63  I constructed two samples due to the fact that permit data and or critical data including
proved reserves data from the Energy Information Association (EIA), the statistics arm of the
U.S. Department of Energy, is not available for some states back to the earliest time period.64
The longer sample begins in 1977 because that is the earliest date when EIA price data are
63 Maryland and Nevada are member states, but were excluded due to a very low level of oil and gas production over
the sample time period.
64 For California, Louisiana,  New Mexico, Montana, and Illinois approved oil and gas permit data is not available
back to 1977.  For Alabama and Texas there is some missing information in the reserves data from the EIA prior to
1990.  In addition, for the entire sample the measure of technological change that I use is available only back to
1991.
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available.  The shorter but larger sample begins in 1990 which is the year when all reporting
states have available permitting information.  Table 10 lists the states in each sample.65
Table 10: Sample States
1990 Sample 1990 Sample 1977 Sample 1977 Sample
Alabama Michigan Alabama Pennsylvania
Alaska Montana Alaska  Texas
Arizona New Mexico Arizona Utah
Arkansas New York Arkansas Wyoming
California Oklahoma Colorado
Colorado Pennsylvania Florida
Florida Texas Indiana
Illinois Utah  Michigan
Indiana Wyoming New York
Louisiana Oklahoma
The data from these states that I used for the analyses fall into three categories: oil and
natural gas (resource) data, political data, and permit data.  The resource data include annualized
information on price and proved reserves for each state and for each resource collected from the
EIA.  The oil price that was used is the crude oil real first purchase price, which is defined by the
EIA as the price paid during the initial transaction involving an equity transfer of the crude oil at
the well site. (EIA, Oil Price)  For natural gas, I used the real commercial natural gas price,
which is available for all sample states over this time frame. 66,67  For both sets of prices I
constructed a three-year moving average of price changes rather in addition to current price
changes to provide a more inclusive measure of the influence of previous prices on leasing.  I
65 There are 19 states in the 1990 sample and 14 states in the 1977 sample.  The 1977 sample is a subset of the 1990
sample.
66 The EIA also tracks a measure of the natural gas first purchase price, but data is not available for all states so I
used commercial price.
67 For the time period from 1977 to 2007, residential prices were also available; however these move with
commercial gas prices and are generally slightly higher reflecting an additional markup.  Since the focus of the
analysis is the first differenced prices, as discussed below, this disparity in the level of natural gas prices is not
expected to be a factor.
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also use futures prices as an indicator of expected prices for producers.68  Futures prices are
reported by the EIA weekly, from this information I constructed an annual average for both oil
and natural gas.69
To approximate the resources available for development in each state, I used proved
reserves.  The EIA tracks proved reserves by state, which “are those volumes of oil and natural
gas that geological and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recoverable
in future years from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions.” 70
(EIA, Reserves)   The proved reserves measure is only an approximation of the available
resources and is contingent on both available technology and prices.  This will be taken into
consideration in the empirical analysis.  The inclusion of price and resource data is critical for
identifying the independent effect of changes in political party affiliation on permit levels
distinct from the influence of market factors.
 In addition to price and reserves, the analysis of market factors also includes the average
annualized real cost of a natural gas or oil well collected from the EIA.  While the cost variable
is not state specific it is an indicator of overall U.S. market costs for producers.  Also, the
percentage of wells drilled horizontally as opposed to vertically is included as a measure of
technological change.  This data is provided by Baker Hughes for the United States weekly back
to 1991 and I constructed an average annual measure.  While the effective use of horizontal
drilling does vary by reservoir type, generally reservoirs for oil and natural gas are much wider
than deep which benefits the ability to use this technique. (Helms, 2008, p.1) It should be noted
68 I have data on oil futures prices back to 1983, while I have natural gas futures prices only back to 1994.  Given
that the two prices are correlated at .87, I use only oil futures prices in the results presented.
69 There are four futures contracts reported for delivery one, two, three, and four months in the future.  The futures
prices are highly correlated and only contract one is used in the analysis.
70 Operators are required to estimate proved reserves for each field annually and the EIA tracks additions and
subtractions to reserves annually by state. (EIA, Reserves)
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that horizontal drilling is more expensive than traditional vertical drilling so like reserves this
measure isn’t independent of price. (Helms, 2008, p.1) It is an indicator for technological
improvements as it was not widely used until the early 1980’s when improved motor technology
and other technological gains allowed for its initial commercial adoption. (Helms, 2008, p.2)
The use of this technique has expanded since then.  In the early 1990’s the percentage of wells
drilled horizontally was consistently less than 10%, but by 2007 the percentage had increased to
greater than 20%. (BH, Rig Count)
Permits
Given that the focus of the analysis will be to measure the effects of markets and politics
on the number of approved permits, the key data for the analysis is permitting data, which I
obtained from each state’s oil and gas commission.  The permit data collected from the state
commissions are an annual measure of the approved permits in each state.  As was discussed
earlier, the discrepancy between approved permits and demanded permits is negligible, however,
to eliminate those few cases where permits were denied, I used only approved permits in the
measure.  Each state’s requirement that all oil and natural gas drilling permits are approved by
their state’s representative body ensures that no additional wells were drilled outside of this
approval process.  In some states it is possible to identify the type of well drilled, whether it was
a new well or a recompletion, however this was not true across all states so the measure used
includes all approved permits.  The aggregation across well types is consistent with the
hypothesis that party matters, independent of the reason for the drilling permit.
To motivate the discussion of the role of prices in determining permit levels, I have
included figures of the trends of both permit levels and resource prices over time, Figures 7-10.
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Figure 7:  Annual Approved Permits – Sample 1977 - 2007
Source: State Oil and Gas Commissions
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Figure 8:  Annual Approved Permits – Sample 1990 - 2007
Source: State Oil and Gas Commissions
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Figure 9:  Annual Resource Prices – Sample 1977-2007
Source: EIA
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Figure 10:  Change in Annual Resource Prices – Sample 1977-2007
Source: EIA
For both sample time frames, the upward trend in the permitting data, the top line, is
apparent from Figures 7 and 8 for most states particularly over the last decade.  Figure 7 shows
the permit data for 1977-2007 sample, while Figure 8 contains the 1990-2007 sample.
In any data analysis in which the data contains a time component, such as these panel
specifications, it is important to consider the influence of time trends.  The presence of
autocorrelation in the dependent variable is contradictory to the basic independence assumptions
of the OLS model and leads to spurious regression results, the coefficients are properly estimated,
however, the statistical significance is not. In Tables 11a and 11b,  I present the results for a test
for autocorrelation in the dependent variable.
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Tables 11a and 11b:  Autocorrelation Test
 Table 11a: Dependent
Variable:  Permits / First
Differenced Permits
1977
Sample
1990
Sample
Table 11b:
Dependent
Variable:
Residuals
1977 Sample 1990 Sample
(1)
OLS
Regression
(2)
First
Differenced
Regression
(1)
OLS
Regression
(2)
First
Differenced
Regression
U.S. Real Oil Futures
Prices
($  /  Barrel)* 37.42*** 41.52**
Lagged
Residuals
0.679*** -0.0794
(3.417) (2.815) (15.06) (-1.451)
Political Party President/
Party Change U.S.
President: Republican to
Democrat -96.60 29.29
Constant
-3.062 -7.073
(-0.745) (0.154) (-0.102) (-0.225)
Political Party Change U.S.
President:
Democrat to Republican 66.68 Observations 306 303
(0.204) R-squared 0.427 0.007
Political Party Senate
Majority Leader/ Party
Change Senate Majority
Leader: Republican to
Democrat -31.35 196.1
(-0.271) (0.564)
Political Party Change
Senate Majority Leader:
Democrat to Republican 92.59
(0.968)
Proved Natural Gas
Reserves (Mmcf) 0.250*** 0.212**
(3.518) (2.674)
Proved Oil Reserves (Mbls) 0.452 1.151***
(1.633) (4.741)
U.S. Real Cost per Crude
Oil, Natural Gas, and Dry
Well Drilled
(Thousand $)* -0.225 -0.264
(-1.421) (-1.162)
Constant -625.9** -11.86
(-2.252) (-0.343)
Observations 324 321
Number of states 14 14
R-squared .953 .249
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
71
The tests show that there is a high degree of autocorrelation.  This high level of
autocorrelation combined with high R-squared values is the classic case of spurious regression
results and brings into question a straightforward OLS specification.  The second columns of
Tables 11a and 11b show that first differencing mitigates identification based solely on this time
trend. And is the specification used throughout this chapter.71  Once again, to illustrate the trend,
see Figures 9 through 12 which show the number of approved permits and prices and the first
differenced permits and prices over time.
Political Information
In addition to understanding the role of the market in determining permit levels, political
influence is of keen interest.  At the state level, I collected political party data for governors and
state and federal legislators and their terms in office from the Council of State Governments.
Using this information, I constructed political variables for each of the states’ Governor’s office,
state Senate, and state House.  At the federal level, I constructed political variables for the U.S.
Senate, and U.S. House, and the President.  For all political variables, I set the variables equal to
1 if the executive or federal leadership was Republican and 0 if Democrat.  For the regression
specifications, I constructed the variables in two ways, first lagged and first differenced.72
Variation for both types of variables is shown in Figures 11 through 16.
71 The political measures were included in the specification in a first differenced format, but they were also included
as lagged measures to analyze the impact of the previous years’ political parties on the current change in permits.
72 The lagged political variables indicate the political party in office prior to the change in permitting.  The
difference political variables indicate the year of change in political party from Republican to Democrat and
Democrat to Republican.
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Figure 11: Political Party of Governor – Sample 1977-2007
Source: Council of State Governments
Figure 12: Political Party of Governor – Sample 1990-2007
Source: Council of State Governments
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Figure 13: Majority Party in State Senate – Sample 1977 - 2007
Source: Council of State Governments
Figure 14: Majority Party in State Senate and House – Sample 1990 - 2007
Source: Council of State Governments
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Figure 15: Political Party of President
Source: Swift et al 1989, Carroll et al 2010
Figure 16: Political Party of Federal Senate Majority Leader
Source: Swift et al 1989, Carroll et al 2010
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The lagged political variables measure the influence of the political party in office on the
subsequent change in permits.  The differenced political variables highlight the effect of changes
in the political climate to determine if shifts from one party to another have an influence on
permitting.
Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis is focused on measuring the influence of political party changes in
the leadership in the state and federal executive and legislative offices on changes in the number
of natural gas and oil permits issued after controlling for resource prices.  The empirical
specifications are two state-year panels.  The first sample is from 1990 through 2007 for 19
states and the second is from 1977 through 2007 for 14 states.  The longer 1977 panel has a
subset of the states in the 19-state panel due to restrictions on the available date.  These panels
allow for the identification of significant changes in the political variables, which change at most
biannually.  They also have the advantage of leveraging state variation in price and reserves. The
specification of the model is:
??? ??????? = ?? + ??????? + ?????? + ???(??? ? ?????) + (???? ? ??????) + ??(?? ?????) + ????
where i =state and t = year. ??? represents the number of annual state oil and natural gas permits
that were approved in each state. Sit-1 represents a set of gubernatorial and state legislative
leadership political party indicators. Zt-1 contains a set of presidential and federal legislative
leadership political party indicators.73 Pt, resource price represents annual state natural gas and
73 This equation represents the case where the lagged political variables are referenced.  In cases where the analysis
focuses on political party changes there will be two variables for each state and federal political variable, Republican
to Democrat changes and Democrat to Republican changes.
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oil prices.74 PRit, proved natural gas and oil reserves.75 Wt contains resource specific measures
such as well costs and technology that change over time only.
My analysis begins with a presentation of the findings for the first differenced
specification with federal political party changes in Table 12.   Table 13 repeats the federal
political analyses with the inclusion of proved reserves.  Finally, Table 14 contains analyses of
party changes in the state political variables.
Market Factors
The analyses in Tables 12 and 13 focus on first differenced oil futures prices.  The results
indicate that they are statistically significant at the ten percent level in the 1977 sample and at the
five percent level in the 1990 sample.76,77
74 This equation shows the case where the price change is commensurate with the permit change.  In addition to this
case, the analysis includes the three year moving average of price changes and futures prices.
75 To address the issues with the proved reserves measures, I ran separate analyses which exclude the reserves
measure.
76 In the 1990 sample, prices were generally positive and statistically significant.  This includes first differenced oil
and natural gas prices, oil and natural gas futures prices, and the three year moving average of first differenced oil
and natural gas prices.  When differenced oil and natural gas prices are included in the same regressions, oil prices
remain significant while natural gas prices lose significance.  All prices are positively correlated.  See Appendix D,
Table D2 for information on price correlations.
77 In the 1977 sample, only futures prices were statistically significant.
77
Table 12: Federal Political Analysis
Dependent Variable:
First Differenced
Permits
1977 Sample 1990 Sample
(1)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
U.S. President
(2)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Senate
Majority
Leader
(3)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
U.S. President
(4)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Senate
Majority
Leader
U.S. Real Oil
Futures ($ /  Barrel)* 57.76* 49.73* 46.04** 45.40**
(1.960) (1.972) (2.620) (2.759)
Political Party
Change: Republican
to Democrat 50.09 424.2 -7.707 397.9***
(0.310) (1.730) (-0.0516) (3.055)
Political Party
Change: Democrat
to Republican 578.1** 89.72 390.2*** 114.7
(2.599) (0.735) (3.032) (1.308)
Post 1987 Indicator 507.8 666.6
(1.417) (1.491)
Post 1992 Indicator -9.126 30.32 -16.64 -12.34
(-0.165) (0.484) (-0.276) (-0.172)
Post 2005  Indicator 261.2** 293.8** 188.4** 223.7**
(2.546) (2.836) (2.274) (2.554)
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled
(Thousand $)* -0.256** -0.503** -0.220*** -0.458***
(-2.663) (-2.657) (-3.355) (-3.836)
Constant -553.1 -712.6 -11.95 -14.02
(-1.390) (-1.464) (-0.215) (-0.248)
Observations 336 336 339 339
Number of states 14 14 19 19
R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.144 0.147
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
*First Differenced
Specifically, for the 1977 sample in Table 12 a ten percentage point increase in the
change in oil futures prices leads on average to a 26 percentage point increase in the change in
permits.78  Given that the average increase in permits is approximately 11.5, this leads to
78 The coefficients on price are diminished in the findings presented in Table 13.  This is not unexpected given the
correlation between price and reserves.
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approximately 3 additional permits per state and year.  The influence of price on permits
indicates that producers are responding to increased resource prices with increased development.
In addition, increases in well costs also influence producers.  For the 1977 sample, a ten
percentage point increase in the change in well costs leads to a 33 percent decrease in permits on
average.79  The findings demonstrate that both well costs and oil futures prices have
economically significant effects on permit changes.
For the 1990 sample, the findings in Table 12 indicate that the  influence from both oil
futures prices and well costs remains statistically and economically significant.80  A ten
percentage point increase in the change in oil futures prices,  leads to an approximately 13
percentage point increase in the change permits on average.81  Given that the average increase in
permits is 69, this leads to approximately an additional nine state permits annually.  For well
costs the effect, on average, is an approximately 8.3 percentage point increase in the change in
permits from a ten percentage point decrease in well costs.  Overall, these results suggest that in
terms of the question Prices or Politics, prices matter.  Markets are clearly having a significant
effect on oil and gas development.  Next, I discuss the role of proved reserves, followed by a
discussion of political influence, and finally an analysis of the influence of regulatory changes.
Proved Reserves
Table 13 contains the same analyses that were presented in Table 12 with the inclusion of
proved reserves.
79 In the 1977 sample, well costs are consistently negative and statistically significant.
80 In addition to well costs and prices in the 1990 sample, the percentage of wells drilled horizontally was also
analyzed.  It was not consistently statistically significant.  This may indicate that horizontal drilling is not a good
measure of technology rather than that technological changes were having no effect.  In the future other technology
measures will be analyzed.
81 In the 1990 sample, well costs were generally negative and often statistically significant.  The 1990 sample also
includes an analysis of the technology measure, the percentage of wells that were drilled horizontally.  In
combination with this technology measure, well costs do often lose their  statistical significance.  This is due to the
fact that they are correlated at 0.67.
79
Table 13: Federal Political Analysis with Proved Reserves
 Dependent
Variable:  First
Differenced Permits
1977 Sample 1990 Sample
(1)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
U.S. President
(2)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Senate
Majority
Leader
(3)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
U.S. President
(4)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Senate
Majority
Leader
U.S. Real Oil
Futures
($ / Barrel)* 30.85** 26.67** 42.86** 41.83***
(2.638) (2.639) (2.691) (2.927)
Political Party
Change: Republican
to Democrat -71.05 211.0** 44.90 275.2***
(-0.544) (2.535) (0.243) (3.459)
Political Party
Change: Democrat
to Republican 392.7*** -17.28 268.2*** 109.9
(3.235) (-0.212) (3.172) (1.201)
Proved Natural Gas
Reserves (Mmcf)* 0.0162 0.0160 0.211** 0.213**
(1.308) (1.194) (2.553) (2.624)
Proved Oil Reserves
(Mbls)* 0.235 0.299 1.170*** 1.146***
(0.920) (1.015) (4.833) (5.022)
Post 1987 Indicator 196.0* 275.6*
(1.850) (2.134)
Post 1992 Indicator 12.13 41.66 -80.25
(0.223) (0.606) (-1.041) -76.16
Post 2005  Indicator 260.0** 257.9** 28.64 (-0.889)
(2.265) (2.513) (0.219) 59.34
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled
(Thousand $)* -0.267** -0.381** -0.163** -0.331***
(-2.382) (-2.581) (-2.222) (-3.840)
Constant -200.9 -280.0 53.49 50.66
(-1.381) (-1.648) (1.016) (0.944)
Observations 288 288 321 321
Number of states 12a 12a 19 19
R-squared 0.114 0.109 0.249 0.251
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: For Alabama and Texas there is some missing information in the production and reserves data from the EIA prior
to 1990.
*First Differenced
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Changes in proved oil and natural reserves were not consistently statistically significant
in the 1977 sample.  This does not indicate that the hypothesis regarding the positive influence of
state resource endowments on permitting is false.  In the first differenced regressions persistent
state characteristics are implicitly controlled for because the regressions focus only on variables
that are changing over time.  This finding indicates only that annual state changes in the amount
of oil and gas resources that are recoverable given the current economic and technological
constraints were not independently significant in influencing permitting over the this 30 year
time frame.
Interestingly, proved oil and natural gas reserves did have a significant effect on
permitting in the 1990 sample.  The sign of the coefficients is indicative of the difficulty in
interpreting proved reserves measures.  While changes in  natural gas reserves positively
influenced changes in permitting, changes in oil reserves negatively influenced changes in
permitting.  The findings in Table 13 indicate that for a ten percentage point increase in natural
gas reserves there is on average an approximately 5.5 percentage point additional increase in
permitting.  For changes in oil reserves, the findings indicate that for a ten percentage point
decrease in oil reserves there is on average an approximately 3.6 percentage point increase in
permitting.  It should be noted that if a three year moving average of reserve changes for natural
gas and oil is analyzed for the 1990 sample, neither of the coefficients is statistically significant.
While it is important to consider the role of reserves as a control for changing state resource
endowment over time, the fact that the effects are unexpectedly negative for oil reserves does not
indicate that there is a negative relationship between resources and permits generally.
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Political Changes
In addition to a discussion of the market influence on permitting, Tables 12 and 13
contain federal level political variables, President and Senate Majority Leader. The analyses
focus on political changes in these variables.
The only coefficient that is consistently statistically significant is on the indicator of a
change in the President’s office from Democrat to Republican.  The findings for the 1977 sample
indicate that a change from a Democrat to a Republican in the President’s office will lead to an
additional increase in permits of between approximately 300 and 600.82  Given that the average
change in permits issued is 11.5, this is clearly a large effect.  It should be noted, however, that
the variation that is used to identify this effect relies on two political transitions, 1980-1981 and
2000 to 2001. (See Figure 15)  These are the transitions from the Carter to the Reagan
Presidency and the Clinton to Bush II Presidency.  The findings suggest that there is an effect on
oil and gas development from  party transitions in the President’s office.83  The findings are not
robust, however, to the alternative political variable specification , when the analysis includes
lagged political variables, indicating that the transitions between parties in office have a stronger
effect than the effect of the party while in office.84  The findings for Senate Majority Leader in
the 1977 sample are consistently statistically insignificant.
The findings regarding the influence of changes in the federal political variables in the
1990 sample are less clear.  The sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the effect of
political change in the President’ s office is not consistent.  This is due to a lack of variation over
82 In the 1977 sample, the magnitude of the increase is decreased to approximately 300 if the two political measures
are included together.  The coefficient remains statistically significant.
83 In addition to analyzing the political variables separately, I also analyzed the federal political changes together.
The findings were consistent with those presented here.  In particular, in the 1977 sample the coefficient on
President maintained its statistical significance and magnitude, while the coefficient on Senate Majority leader was
generally insignificant.
84 The findings regarding the lagged political variables are consistent across both state and federal political variables.
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the shorter time frame.  There is a single Democrat to Republican  transition and  also one
Republican to Democrat transition.  The results in Tables 12 and 13  indicate a statistically
significant and positive effect from the Clinton to Bush II transition, but this finding varies with
the inclusion of other combinations of price, cost, and technology measures.85  Tables 12 and 13
also indicate a positive and statistically significance influence on permitting from a change from
a Republican to a Democrat Senate Majority Leader.  Again, the finding varies with the inclusion
of other price, cost, and technology measures and is generally not statistically significant.86
Given  the shorted time frame and limited variation in the federal political measures, it is not
possible to identify significant effects in either office.
The results regarding the state political measures were consistent across both the 1977
and 1990 samples.  None of the three measures, governor, state House leadership, or state Senate
leadership were statistically significant.87  See Table 14 for more information on the state
political regressions.88,89
85 In particular, the findings change sign if the analysis uses a natural gas price measure .
86 Once again, the exclusion of oil prices leads to a change in sign for this political variable.
87 The coefficients on changes in political office and lagged political indicators lacked statistically significance.
88 In addition to analyses that focused only on state or federal regressions, I also analyzed them jointly.  The state
political variables remained statistically insignificant.
89 The state House measure was also insignificant when run individually or in combination with the governor party
indicator variables.  The state House and state Senate variables were not run simultaneously due to colinearity
concerns, they are correlated at approximately .6.
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Table 14: State Political Analysis with Proved Reserves
Dependent Variable:
First Differenced
Permits
1977 Sample 1990 Sample
(1)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Governor
(2)
Political
Variable of
Interest – State
Senate
Majority
Leader
(3)
Political
Variable of
Interest –
Governor
(4)
Political
Variable of
Interest – State
Senate
Majority
Leader
U.S. Real Oil
Futures
($ / Barrel)* 28.22** 27.40** 38.74** 38.45**
(2.690) (2.729) (2.810) (2.760)
Political Party
Change: Republican
to Democrat 74.94 473.9 -169.6 -61.34
(0.523) (1.569) (-0.944) (-0.152)
Political Party
Change: Democrat
to Republican -88.88 922.2 -68.66 -214.4
(-1.375) (1.131) (-0.848) (-1.194)
Proved Natural Gas
Reserves (Mmcf)* 0.0173 0.0111 0.224** 0.222**
(1.170) (0.965) (2.885) (2.725)
Proved Oil Reserves
(Mbls)* 0.250 0.490 1.204*** 1.166***
(0.993) (1.697) (4.877) (5.296)
Post 1987 Indicator 200.9* 218.3
(1.861) (1.558)
Post 1992 Indicator 47.30 38.79 -55.21 -40.26
(0.655) (0.681) (-0.678) (-0.507)
Post 2005 Indicator 228.1* 269.8 -10.71 0.384
(2.164) (1.749) (-0.0746) (0.00271)
U.S. Real Cost per
Crude Oil, Natural
Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled
(Thousand $)* -0.264** -0.251* -0.135 -0.159**
(-2.225) (-2.043) (-1.544) (-2.263)
Constant -208.3 -253.6 68.33 54.05
(-1.368) (-1.383) (1.194) (0.866)
Observations 288 288 321 321
Number of states 12a 12a 19 19
R-squared 0.105 0.148 0.245 0.244
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: For Alabama and Texas there is some missing information in the production and reserves data from the EIA prior
to 1990.
*First Differenced
84
Regulations
Regulations provide a second avenue of influence for politicians.  In Tables 12 and 13, I
include indicators for important federal regulatory changes.  State regulations will be addressed
in more detail in subsequent work.90  For the 1977 sample, the only regulatory change that was
consistently statistically significant was the 2005 Energy Policy Act.91  As expected, the
magnitude of the change is also economically significant after controlling for the increase in
prices that also occurred in this time frame.92  For each state and year after 2005, the findings
indicate that there will be an additional approximately 250 to 300 permits, a strong influence.
The significance of FOOGLRA, the federal leasing reform act, is also positive, but is not robust
across specifications.93
The findings regarding the importance of the 2005 Energy Policy Act are not robust
across samples.  For the 1990 sample, the inclusion of changes in proved reserves changes
eliminates the statistical significance of the 2005 federal regulatory change.  Given that proved
reserves measures are dependent on the market conditions, this is not surprising.  It does bring
into question whether the increase in permitting after 2005 can solely be attributed to the
regulatory change rather than a combination of changes in market and regulatory factors.
90 Due to the fact that persistent state characteristics are  implicitly controlled for in these analyses, the portion of
each state’s regulatory environment that is due to the unique time independent characteristics of that state is
controlled for in these regressions.  Future work will focus on changes in state regulations on oil and gas
development.
91 Tables 6 and 7 do not present the results for the 1989 natural gas regulatory change.  This regulation was also
analyzed and was not statistically significant.
92 For the 1977 sample, the significance and magnitude of this influence is consistent across specifications that
include the other price measures including change in real natural gas or oil prices, and  a three year moving average
of the change in natural gas or oil prices.  The inclusion of reserves does not diminish significance or magnitude of
this finding.
93 For futures prices and the three year moving average of price changes, this variable is consistently statistically
significant, but it loses its significance if the analysis includes price changes.
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Conclusion
These findings indicate that oil and natural gas development over the 30 years from 1977
through 2007 has been determined largely by changes in market factors, primarily oil and natural
gas futures prices and well costs.  Although the popular perception was that Republicans were
independently fueling this development, the results show that across both sample time frames the
political party did not generally determine permitting levels.  In particular, the state elected
political leaders at the time of the increased development were coincident with rather than
instigators of the development.  The influence of the President’s office on permitting found for
the 1977 sample was significant, however, the robustness of the effect is hampered by a limited
amount of variation.  These findings do not support the literature that political party is influential
in terms of this state level bureaucratic outcome, but they have no bearing on the arguments
regarding the constraining influence of political party within the congressional setting as argued
by Levy (2004) and others.  Overall, in the debate over whether it is politics or prices that are
determining changes in oil and gas permitting, the findings indicate that prices are having a
stronger influence than politics.
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CHAPTER 4
What’s Powering Wind?
The Role of Prices and Policies in Determining the Amount of Wind Energy Development
in the United States (1994-2008)
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“Pop quiz: what source of power doesn't come out of the ground,
doesn't burn and isn't radioactive?
Hint: it contributed the most new electricity generation to the U.S.
grid in 2008.
The answer is wind power, the technology that has become
synonymous with going green.” (Walsh, 2009)
Purpose
This chapter examines the influence of electricity markets and renewable energy
regulations on the growth of wind energy development across the United States from 1994
through 2008.  This time period encompasses the expansion of commercial scale wind
development beyond states such as California, which participated in the nascent wind market in
the 1980s.  Since then wind energy production has grown into a more geographically dispersed
and established industry.  This chapter contributes to existing literature on wind development by
providing a theoretical and empirical framework to analyze the combined influence of both
regulatory and market factors.
Other papers have focused on analyzing the efficacy of specific policies regarding
renewable energy development.  Several articles define the basic components of a Renewables
Portfolio Standard (RPS) and include information on the evolution of RPS implementation
across and within states (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; Rader and Norgaard, 1996; Wiser et al,
2007; Wiser and Barbose, 2007; Wiser, Porter, and Grace, 2004; Cory and Swezey, 2007)
Overwhelmingly this literature has argued that RPS are effective in increasing renewables
development.  In addition to the work on RPS, Gouchoe, Everette and Haynes (2002) provide a
case study of ten financial incentives across six states, including a list of recommendations for a
better design of financial incentives.  Their paper uses the same data source, the Database of
State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency  (DSIRE) database, that I use in this analysis.
(DSIRE, db)  An important contribution of my work is the theoretical model and empirical
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analysis of the influence of regulations rather than a descriptive case study of these programs.
Also, much of the existing literature focuses on a short time frame, while this chapter includes a
fifteen year time period.94
In addition to the body of literature that is focused solely on policy determinants, Bird et
al (2005) provide descriptive work focused on both policy and market factors that are influencing
wind energy development across states.  They argued that state tax and financial incentives along
with RPS are important policies to encourage wind development.  In addition, they contended
that lower costs for wind projects are due in part to technological improvements in wind turbines
and in part to federal tax incentives including the Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC).  They
also maintained that high and volatile natural gas prices have led to increases in wind
development by making wind more cost effective. (Bird et al, 2005, p. 1405)
Menz and Vachon (2006) extended the literature on wind energy development beyond a
descriptive case study approach to an OLS analysis using multiple state policies.  Their cross-
sectional specification covered the time period  from 1998 through 2003 across 39 states and
included a binary indicator for each regulation and a control for wind potential.  Some of their
key findings were that RPS and mandatory green power option programs are positively related to
increases in wind energy development.  My work improves on their empirical analysis because it
includes a panel specification that focuses on states with significant wind energy potential.  I
exclude states that have enacted renewables policies but do not have the resources present to
develop wind capacity.95  Second, by including market controls the role of policies can be
94 Due to limitations on some data a shorter analysis from 1998-2008 was also completed.
95 Due to their limited number of observations, Menz and Vachon (2006) were not able to exclude state’s that do not
have sufficient wind potential for commercial wind production. (See (DOE, WPA) for information on each state’s
commercial scale wind development potential.)
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analyzed in the context of existing market constraints.  Lastly, my project expands the set of
policies that are studied.96
Building on the work of Menz and Vachon (2006), Carley (2009) also provides an
empirical analysis of the impact of renewable energy policies, including RPS.  Her focus,
however, is on renewable electricity generation rather than wind capacity.  Sine and Lee (2008)
also empirically examined the role of policies on wind energy development.  However, their
focus was on predicting the number of wind energy projects that were registered with the Federal
Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) between 1978 and 1992.  Though the authors’ focused
on the wind energy market, their goal in identifying the determinants of development in the early
stages of the wind market are quite distinct from the focus of my project.  It is interesting to note
that they do find that state regulations generally had an impact in terms of wind development
during the nascent years of the wind energy market.  My project extends this analysis on the role
of policies in the development of the wind industry beyond its initial establishment as a market,
during a time of rapid expansion both within and across states.  Overall, while there has been
some descriptive work on the role of markets and policies in determining the amount of wind
development in the United States and some empirical work on the role of regulations in wind
development, this project is the first to synthesize the role that prices and policies played in
influencing the growth of the U.S. wind industry during the time when it was expanding
nationwide.
Background
Wind energy development is motivated by a complex set of factors.  It is determined in
part by the need to find renewable energy sources in the face of declining fossil fuel resources.  It
96 See the Data Section for a complete description of each renewable policy.
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is also propelled by increasing concerns over climate change and the desire to implement energy
production technologies that do not add additional carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.  Due to
the lower cost of wind compared with solar, wind has become the dominant non-hydrogen
renewable energy source.
Wind is an abundant renewable energy resource in the United States.  It is estimated that
wind energy could supply 20% of the electricity in the United States.  (Elliott, Wendell, and
Glower, 1991, p. v)  This estimate is derived from wind potential estimates produced by  the
Pacific Northwest Laboratory in 1991.97 (Elliott, Wendell, and Glower, 1991)  While these
statistics are only theoretically feasible and are constrained by a set of assumptions including the
absence of transmission limitations, they do demonstrate the abundance of wind resources in the
United States.  To emphasize the theoretically feasible supply of wind energy in the U.S., it is
often noted that “the wind potential of just three states – North and South Dakota and Texas –
could supply all the country’s electricity.” (Gipe, 1995, p. xiii-xiv)  The impressive U.S. wind
potential findings in this 1991 report are reinforced by a new 2010 wind potential study.  The
wind potential estimates in the new report exceed those presented previously due to
improvements in wind technology.  Due in part to this vast potential wind development has been
increasing significantly in recent years.
History of Wind Development in the United States
Commercial wind development in the United States began in the 1980s.  It was the first
time in U.S. history that wind energy projects included multiple wind turbines sited together
rather than implementing a single turbine at each site. (Gipe, 1995, p.13)  It was during this time
that the notion of a wind farm developed.  The impetus for wind development was the same as
97 Wind potential calculations indicate the amount of wind that a state or region is theoretically capable of producing
under a specific set of assumptions.
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that for all renewable energy, a “scramble to develop alternative energy after the oil embargoes
of the 1970s.” (Gipe, 1995, p.2)  This initial commercial wind development in the 1980s was
limited to a few states, primarily California.98  The mid-1980s represented the first peak in wind
development  This peak however pales in comparison to the growth in wind capacity that has
been seen since then. 99,100
The growth of wind energy development in the United States since the 1980s has been a
tale of two decades.  A lull in the early 1990s was followed by a period of significant increase in
wind capacity additions beginning in the late 1990s.101 (AWEA, projects db)  By 2000, wind
projects were dramatically increasing in size compared with their 1980s counterparts.  Total
wind capacity was also increasing, by 2003 U.S. wind energy capacity had maintained an
average annual growth rate of 24.5 percent for the previous five years and as of 2005 the United
States was the worldwide leader in wind capacity additions. (WPO, 2003, p.2)   This trend
continued through 2008, which proved to be a record year.  “Wind installations in 2008 were not
only the largest on record in the U.S., but were more than 60% higher than the previous U.S.
record, set in 2007.” (WPO, 2008, p. 3)
While wind projects have been sprouting up throughout the United States, the increase in
U.S. wind capacity is not matched by a correspondingly dramatic increase in terms of renewable
electricity production from wind.  Wind power  in 1999 provided less than 1% of total U.S.
electricity. (GWEMR,  1999, p. 1) This remained true though 2006 and by 2008  wind generated
98 According to the AWEA projects database Minnesota had one small wind project, < 1 MW in 1987.  All other
wind projects prior to 1992 were in California.
99 The 1980s peak coincided with the expiration of federal energy tax credits in 1985 and California state energy tax
credits which also expired in the mid-1980s.
100 Capacity, measured in megawatts, is the amount of power that a wind turbine is capable of producing. (Gipe 1995,
p.9)  To determine a state’s capacity, individual turbine capacities are first summed for each wind project and then
the project wind capacities are added to determine a state and year wind capacity measure.
101 Wind capacity in this chapter is measured in two different ways, wind capacity additions and cumulative  wind
capacity.  Wind capacity additions are the megawatts of wind capacity that are added in each state and year.
Cumulative wind capacity is the total available wind capacity for each state and year.
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only 1.25% of the nation’s electricity. (WPO,  2006, p. 1; AWEA, AWIR, p.2)  Despite this
small increase in the percentage of total electricity generated from wind, it has made inroads in
terms of new generating capacity.  From 2000 to 2004 wind contributed only 4 percent of all new
electricity generating capacity in the United States (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)  Since then
there has been a steady rise.  In 2005, wind’s contribution increased to 12 percent.  For 2006, it
rose again to 18 percent. (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)  Subsequently, for 2007 and 2008, the
rise was dramatic, in 2007 and 2008 wind accounted for 35 percent and 42 percent of new
electricity generating capacity. (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)  In fact, 2008 was the fourth
consecutive year when wind power was second only to natural gas in terms of electricity
generating capacity added. (Wiser and Bolinger 2009, p. iii)
To understand the factors that are leading to this increased development I provide a
theoretical framework which models a robust set of policy and market factors which may have
influenced wind development.  This framework includes both sides of the wind energy market,
wind producers and wind energy consumers.
Theoretical Framework
I base the theoretical framework on the standard economic supply and demand model.  In
this case, the supply side is determined by wind producers who provide the available wind
energy for wind generated electricity, while the demand side is driven by electricity producers
who demand renewable electricity.
Supply
The supply side focuses on a profit maximizing wind developer such that firms produce
the profit maximizing level of wind energy for wind generated electricity.  For the j-th producer:
qj = g(xj,yj) (1)
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Wind energy for wind generated electricity output, qj, is expressed as a function of wind inputs,
including wind capacity, xj, and an additional composite input, yj, that includes direct wind
project inputs such as capital and labor.  The output is determined by a production function that
varies across firms. For the j-th profit maximizing producer:
?? = p?g?x?, y??– (w? ? R? ? 	FI?)x? + (w? ? R? ? FI?)y?	 (2)
Output price, pw, is the price received for the sale of the wind generated electricity to electricity
producers.  Given the small influence of wind producers in the electricity market, producers will
take this price as given.  Input costs for capacity and other project inputs, wc and wy, are
influenced by a set of regulations, R,  and financial incentives, FI that are designed to increase
wind capacity by reducing costs.  Regulations and financial incentives can be directly focused on
increasing wind capacity, ?? and ???, or on indirectly increasing wind capacity by providing
direct incentives for capital and labor inputs for wind project development, ?? and ???.
Producer j develops some level of wind capacity J ? N, where N is the total wind potential
available.
Solving the standard profit maximizing model leads to some important implications
regarding the role of input costs and prices.  It can be shown that:
Wind Capacity:
???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0, ???
???
> 0,?????	 ???
????
> 0
Composite development good:
???
???
< 0,?????	 ???
???
<> 0,					 ???
???
> 0,?????	 ???
????
> 0
Wind capacity will decrease as costs increase and increase as regulations or financial incentives
that promote renewables development increase.  The influence of other costs and regulations is
not clear in this case.  A similar case is found for the composite good.  In addition, it can be
shown that in terms of prices, an increase in the price for wind generated electricity will lead to
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either a direct increase in wind capacity or an increase in development inputs or both, but the
specific influence is not known given the standard profit maximization assumptions.
Demand
The demand side for wind generated electricity is determined by electricity producers
demand for renewable electricity.  For the k-th electricity producer :
?? = ?(?? ,?? ,?? 	,??? ,?) (3)
The quantity of wind generated electricity, ?? , that is demanded is a function of the price of
wind generated electricity,???, the total quantity of electricity produced,? ? , the price of
substitute fuels, coal,???, and natural gas,????, and the preferences of consumers for renewable
electricity, ?.  The quantity varies by state, i, and year, t.  Electricity producer k consumes some
level of wind energy for wind generated electricity K ? M, where M is the total wind energy that
has been produced.
Assuming that wind generated electricity is a normal good, I expect that increases in ??
will lead to decreased demand for wind generated electricity.  Given that wind generated
electricity is a component of total electricity, increases in ??  are expected to lead to increases in
demand for wind generated electricity.  Under the assumption that wind generated electricity and
electricity generated from traditional fuels are substitutes, I expect an increase in either ?? or ???
to lead to increases in demand for wind generated electricity.  Lastly, I anticipate that an increase
in preferences for wind generated electricity, ?, will lead to increased demand.
Reduced Form
The reduced form approach that I present below allows me to estimate the relationship
between wind capacity and the relevant independent variables without necessitating a measure of
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the price of wind generated electricity.102  The reduced form of the model, for a given level of
wind potential is:103
????????????????????? = ? ?? + ????? 	+ ???? + ????? + ?????? + ? ???
?????????????? ??????? = ? ?? + ????? 	+ ?????? + ????? + ??????? + ????? + ? ???104, 105
where, in equilibrium:
????????????? =	 1(?? ? ??)	[(???? ? ????) + ???????? + ???????? + ?????????? + ??????? ? ??????
? ??????? ? ????????]
where, based on the theoretical model:
?? > 0,?? < 0,?? > 0,?? > 0
?? < 0, ??? > 0, ??? > 0,?? > 0, ??? > 0
Based on the equilibrium equation, this implies that the expected coefficient on? ? is
negative, increases in wind project costs will lead to decreases in wind capacity. The expected
coefficients on the remaining variables, ???? , ???, ????, ????, ?????,and ??? are positive.  Increases
in quantity of electricity, prices of substitute fuels, renewable energy regulations and financial
incentives, and preferences for renewable energy will all lead to increased wind capacity.
102 The annual price or electricity by state is available from the Energy Information Association (EIA), the statistics
arm of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), but the price of  wind generated electricity is not separately tracked
by the EIA annually over this time.
103 In the empirical analysis, wind potential will be included as a control through the construction of the dependent
variable.  The dependent variable that is analyzed is the annual states wind capacity divided by the state’s wind
potential.
104Where ???	= Price of Wind generated electricity/Renewable Electricity;??= Project costs; ??? = Regulation;
???? = Financial Incentives; ????= Quantity of electricity produced; ??? = Price of Coal; ?????= Price of Natural Gas;
???  = Tastes
105 For the analysis, I use annual coal prices rather than annual state coal prices so that the analysis focuses on the
overall influence of coal prices on electricity including states for which no state coal prices are available, such as
California.
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Data
To complete the analysis, my project uses data from three main categories.  First wind
measures, both wind potential and wind capacity, second renewable energy policy indicators,
and third relevant electricity market factors.  I discuss each of these categories and the
corresponding constructed variables in more detail below.  The goal of this chapter is to
determine the wind development impacts of both financial incentives and regulations after
controlling for a variety of market factors that  may have influenced wind development.  The
time period  for this analysis covers the years 1994 through 2008, a period of rapid growth in
wind development and also a time of rapid change in terms of both the regulatory environment
and energy market.
While the dramatic rise in commercial scale development did not occur until about 1998,
1994 represents the first year when a state other than California implemented projects of greater
than 1 MW with the exception of two projects in Hawaii in the 1980s.106 (AWEA, projects db)
Given that other states were participating in commercial wind development prior to 1998, I feel
that it is important to consider prior years when commercial scale wind was beginning its
expansion across the United States.  Figure 17 demonstrates the marked 1998 increase in wind
development and its more marginal rise beginning in 1994.
106 See Figure 17 for a graph of U.S. Wind Capacity from 1994 through 2008.
Commercial scale development began in Hawaii in 1985, in Iowa in 1992 and prior to 1985 in California.  Hawaii
and Alaska are excluded from this analysis, which focuses on the contiguous United States do to availability of wind
potential estimates.
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Figure 17:  U.S. Cumulative Wind Capacity and Added Capacity by Year
Source: (AWEA, projects db)
In addition to determining the time frame for analysis, it is also important to establish the
sample states for inclusion in the analysis.  For this project, the wind potential of a state was the
determining factor.  Wind potential is a set of measures that provide information on the amount
of wind that a state would be capable of producing.  A key reason that wind potential was a
constraining factor in sample definition is that the policies that I analyzed are not wind specific,
they are focused on renewables generally.  In particular, states with RPS, but with zero wind
potential are excluded from the analysis.  While RPS in these states may influence renewables
development generally, it would not be expected to lead to increases in wind generating capacity
within the state.107
107 The cross-state impacts of RPS programs are not analyzed in this chapter.  While some RPS do allow for the
importation of wind development from other states, this analysis focuses only on within-state impacts.
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To construct the sample, I used two measures of wind potential.  First, I used the measure
of wind potential constructed in 1991.108  (Elliot, 1991, p. B-1)   Second, I use the updated 2010
wind potential measurements constructed by NREL. (NREL, AWS) The two measures differ
based on technological and land use assumptions.109  They provide different wind potential
ratings for each state.  I used the information from both wind potential studies for my project to
identify which states would be included in the sample.  The sample of states is based on the top
20 states using the 1991 and 2010 wind potential ratings.  Due to overlap this led to a sample of
25 states, which are the same states as the top 25 states using the 2010 potential ratings.  Figure
18 contains the wind potential rankings by state for the sample states using the 1991 potential
information.
108 The 1991 measure was for the contiguous U.S., excluding Hawaii and Alaska.
109 For instance, the 1991 measure was constructed at 50m due to the availability of wind technology at the time,
while the 2010 measure was constructed at 80m.
The 1991 measure that I used was developed by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory under a scenario that all areas
with class 3 or higher wind resources were developed.  Further, certain lands that were unlikely to be developed
were excluded such as lands that were protected due to environmental concerns, in certain urban, forested, or
agricultural setting.  This is referred to as scenario 3. (Elliott, 1991, p. B-1)
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Figure 18:  Wind Potential by State
There are two wind potential measures for the 1991 and 2010 models, potential installed
capacity in megawatts and potential annual generation in gigawatt-hours.  “The ‘Installed
Capacity’ shows the potential megawatts (MW) of rated capacity that could be installed on the
available windy land area, and the ‘Annual Generation’ shows annual wind energy generation in
gigawatt-hours (GWh) that could be produced from the installed capacity.” 110 (NREL, AWS)
For the analysis, I used the potential installed capacity by state because it is measured in
megawatts which corresponds to the wind capacity variable that is also measured in megawatts.
After establishing a sample time period and set of states, the most critical data for
analyzing wind development over this time period  is a measure of wind development.  For this
110 The installed capacity calculations are based on an assumption of 5 MW/km2 of installed capacity.
The top 25 states in terms of both measures were identical.
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chapter, I use added wind capacity by state and year for each state. 111  At its most disaggregated
level, wind capacity is a measure in megawatts (MW) of the capacity rating of each turbine
installed at a wind project.  I collected the data for this research primarily from the AWEA wind
projects database.112  The AWEA projects database reports wind capacity as a cumulative project
capacity.  The number reported is the turbine rating, the capacity rating of each turbine,
multiplied by the number of turbines for each project.  Using this information, I constructed a
state-year added capacity measure for use in the dependent variable.113
In addition to wind capacity, I use 1991 wind potential to construct the dependent
variable.  The dependent variable is equal to the state-year wind capacity variable divided by the
state wind potential.  This provides a measure of the relative wind capacity in a state as
compared with its overall wind resource allotment.114
Regulations and Financial Incentives
After the construction of the dependent variable for this analysis, I constructed the
regulatory variables, regulations and financial incentives.  This data set was based largely off of
information collected in the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE)
111 The current measures of wind potential are for the 48 –contiguous states only and therefore Hawaii and Alaska
are excluded from this analysis.
112 The AWEA contains commercial scale wind projects, generally over 100 kW.  “Commercial scale wind refers to
wind energy projects greater than 100 kW. Typically, the electricity is sold rather than used on-site. This category
can include large arrays of 100 or more turbines owned by large corporations or a single locally-owned wind turbine
greater than 100 kW in size.” (Windustry)
113 To create this variable, I began with data provided  by the DOE through NREL for the time period from 1999
through 2008 using data from the Global Energy Concepts (DNV-GEC) database which is jointly maintained by the
AWEA and made publicly available through AWEA as the AWEA projects database.  The database provided by the
AWEA contains information prior to 1999 and for the purposes of my project the added wind capacity measure was
constructed for the years from 1994 to 1998 so that a fifteen year sample is available for analysis.  This constructed
five year sample was then appended to the state-year cumulative capacity measures as presented by NREL.  There
are some discrepancies in the cumulative capacity information that is constructed prior to 1999 as detailed in
Appendix C.
114 I also constructed an indicator for wind potential over time, wind potential interacted with year indicators, to
control for the potentially disparate impacts of wind potential on states over time.
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database. 115  From this database, I used only those regulations and financial incentives that
focused on wind projects over 100 kW and that had been implemented prior to the end of
2008.116  I restricted this set of data to include State Loan Programs and State Grant Programs
from the set of  state financial incentives.117  In addition, I included the following state
regulations, State Green Power Purchasing/Aggregation (GPA), Renewables Portfolio
Standards118 (RPS), and Mandatory Green Power Option Programs (MGPP).  In addition to these
state specific measures, I also constructed a measure of the Federal Production Tax Credit
(PTC).119
To supplement the regulation information provided in the DSIRE database, I used data
from the Green Pricing, Utility Programs by State information that is provided by the
Department of Energy, Energy and Efficiency Program to construct a Green Power Purchasing
Option Programs (GPP) indicator.120  I include details on the sample data that I used to construct
measures for each of these policies in Tables 15-19.  Below I provide a detailed description of
each policy.
State Loan and Grant Programs
The state grant and loan programs in this analysis were those that provided financial
support for the development of commercial scale wind projects.  The programs were not
115 The copy of the DSIRE database that my project for this analysis contained updates though August 2009 and was
obtained in September 2009 as an MS Access database.  The database “is a comprehensive source of information on
state, local, utility, and federal incentives and policies that promote renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Established in 1995 and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, DSIRE is an ongoing project of the North
Carolina Solar Center and the Interstate Renewable Energy Council.” (DSIRE)
116 If a financial incentive or regulation expired in a given year, it was coded as active for that year.  If a financial
incentive or regulation began in November or December of a given year, it was coded as active for the following
year.  I coded all other financial incentives as active in the year in which they were implemented.
117 Given the limited number of programs, I combined both state grant and loan programs into a single variable for
the purposes of this analysis.
118 I verified all information on Renewables Portfolio Standards using information from Wiser and Barbose (2008).
119 Information on the Production Tax Credit in the DSIRE database was supplemented using information from
Wiser, Bolinger, and Barbose (2007).
120 See (Green Power Markets).
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generally wind specific and instead targeted increases in renewable energy in their respective
states through financing options that were intended to make the projects more attractive to
developers.121  The loan programs generally offer below market interest rates for funding of
renewable development, while the grant programs provide funds outright to encourage
renewables projects.122
An example of a loan program is Iowa’s Alternative Energy Revolving Loan Program
(AERLP), which provides loans for the construction of renewable energy production projects in
Iowa.  The program began in 1996 with a limit of $1 million dollars per organization and a 20
year maximum term per loan which was interest free for 50% of the loan with the remainder
provided by a lender at a market rate.  (DSIRE, Iowa)  The program continues presently and was
expanded in 2009.  An application is required, the deadlines for application vary by the size of
the project.  This loan program has been successful.  “As of March 2009, the AERLP had
provided loans of more than $11.4 million in support of 88 renewable energy projects.” (DSIRE,
Iowa)
Using information for each state, I constructed three indices for state loan and grant
programs.  The first is an indicator variable, indicator index, that is set to one in the years in
which the first loan or grant program was enacted in a given state.  The second, the sum index, is
the sum of the active loan or grant programs in a given year for each state.  And the third, the
years from index, is the number of years from the first active loan or grant program in each
121 The terms of the loan and grant programs varied, but all required an application and award process for the
projects.  The inclusion of a project in this sample is restricted only by the years in which the programs were active,
but not by whether wind or other developers utilized the programs or whether the programs were successful.
122 It should be noted that states that offer financial incentives to encourage wind project development generally
structure their policies so as to allow the use of the financial incentives in conjunction with the federal PTC, so that
the implementation of these policies is not exclusive but rather complementary. (Wiser, Bolinger, and Barbose ,2007,
p. 10-11)
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state.123  Table 15 contains information on the years in which a state or loan program became
active and expired by state.  It is clear from Table 15 that there is considerable variation in the
timing of the implementation of these programs.
Table 15: State Loan and Grant Programs by Year Effective
Year Effective
State Program Expiration
2002 California State Loan Program 2003
2007 Colorado State Grant Program
1996 Iowa State Loan Program
1983, 1989, 1994, 2007 Minnesota State Loan Program
1989 Missouri State Loan Program
2001 Montana State Loan Program
2004 New Mexico State Grant Program 2005
2001 New York State Loan Program
1999 Ohio State Grant Program
2002 Ohio State Loan Program 2007
1980 Oregon State Loan Program
1988 Texas State Loan Program
2002 Wisconsin State Grant Program
Source: DSIRE database
Note: The table includes expiration dates only if they are within the sample time frame. (Prior to 2009)
Green Power Purchasing Option
In addition to offering financial incentives states have implemented regulations that
support the development of renewable energy.  GPP are a popular program across states.  These
programs offer consumers the opportunity to increase the amount of renewable electricity that is
generated through payment of an additional fee on their utility bill.  The amount of the fee and
the specific rules of the programs vary, but the additional funds are utilized to provide an
offsetting amount of renewable energy generation in the amount of the customer’s overall energy
use.  While not a direct purchase of renewable energy, the programs are designed to increase the
overall amount of renewable electricity generation.
123 All variables are zero in years in which no program has started and are set to zero once a program or in the case
of the sum index, all programs have expired.
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These programs are implemented by utilities and therefore each state can have multiple
programs starting in different years providing variation for analysis.  One example, in Colorado
in 1997 the Public Service Company of Colorado, the state’s largest utility, offered a green
pricing option to its customers.  The consumers could buy 100 kilowatthour blocks of renewable
energy for a premium of 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour. (Green Power Markets) Other programs
were subsequently offered in Colorado by other utilities.
To encourage the development of GPP programs states have also stepped in and
mandated that utilities offer a green power option to their customers.  These Mandatory Utility
Green Power Option (MGPP) programs are also analyzed in this chapter to determine the
potentially disparate impacts of state programs directed at utilities and utility programs offered
directly to consumers.  Table 16 presents a list of the total number of active GPP offered by
utilities in each state along with a list of states that have implemented mandates requiring that
utilities offer these programs.124
Table 16: Green Power Purchasing Option Programs
Year GPP Programs Effective State
Total GPP
Programs
Mandatory Utility
Green Power Option
1997, 1999, 2000(2), 2003,
2004(3), 2006, 2008 California 10
1997(2), 1998, 1999(3), 2007,
2008 Colorado 8 2007
2001, 2002, 2003(2) Idaho 4
1997, 2000, 2003, 2005 Illinois 4
1998, 2000, 2001 Indiana 3
1998, 2000(2), 2001(2), 2003(5),
2004(2), 2006(1) Iowa 13 2004
2000(2), 2004, 2005, 2007 Michigan 5
1998(3), 1999, 2000(2), 2002(5),
2003(1) Minnesota 12 2001
2000(2), 2003, 2007 Missouri 4
2000, 2001, 2002(2), 2003(2) Montana 6 2003
124 Note:  Mandates do vary in terms of which utilities are required to provide a green power option.  For some states,
the mandates focus on all Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs), for others the requirement only affects utilities of a
certain size, i.e. with a customer base over some minimum number of individuals.
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Year GPP Programs Effective State
Total GPP
Programs
Mandatory Utility
Green Power Option
2001, 2002 Nebraska 2
1999, 2001, 2003(2), 2005 New Mexico 5 2003
1999, 2000, 2002 North Dakota 3
2000, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008 Ohio 5
2003(2), 2004(2) Oklahoma 4
1999(2), 2000, 2001, 2002(5),
2003(3), 2004, 2005, 2007(3) Oregon 17 2007
2000, 2001, 2002 South Dakota 3
1997, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006 Texas 5
2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 Utah 5
1999(2), 2000(2), 2001, 2002(8),
2003(2), 2005, 2007 Washington 17 2001
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002 Wisconsin 7
1999, 2000(2), 2001, 2003, 2006 Wyoming 6
Source: Green Power Markets and DSIRE db
Note: Kansas, Maine, New York do not have Green Power Option Programs.
Note: The table includes expiration dates only if they are within the sample time frame, prior to 2009, no Green Power Purchase
Option Programs expired during that time frame.
For this analysis, I constructed three separate variables for the GPP. The indicator, sum,
and years from indices.  In addition, I constructed indicator and years from indices for the
MGPP.
Renewables Portfolio Standards
It is clear from the Table 16 that utility GPP programs are prevalent across states.
Another widely discussed and popular state program is the Renewables Portfolio Standard
(RPS).  Fundamentally, an RPS is a requirement that the utilities in a state produce a certain
amount of electricity using renewable energy sources.  The amount of electricity generation that
must be supplied from renewables varies in percentage and in the year of required
implementation. See Table 17 for detailed information.
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Table 17:  RPS Goal by State and Year of Goal Implementation
State Mandate/Goal
(Percentage of Electricity
Generated from
Renewable Energy)
State Mandate/Goal
(Percentage of Electricity
Generated from
Renewable Energy)
California 20% by 2010 Montana 15% by 2015
Colorado 20% by 2020 New Mexico 20% by 2020
Illinois (Optional)
 (5% by 2010 and 15% by
2020) New York 24% by 2013
Illinois 25% by 2025 North Dakota (Optional) 10% by 2015
Iowa 105 MW by 1999 Oregon 5-25% by 2025
Maine 30% by 2000 South Dakota (Optional) 10% by 2015
Michigan 10% by 2015 Texas 5880 MW by 2015
Minnesotaa 825 MW by 2002 Utah (Optional) 20% by 2025
Minnesota (Optional) 10% by 2015 Washington 15% by 2020
Minnesota 25-30% by 2020-2025 Wisconsin 10% by 2015
Missouri (Optional) 11% by 2020
a: This RPS legislation was focused only on Xcel Energy. It is scheduled to expire in 2010. The mandatory RPS does not apply to
Xcel Energy until 2010.
Source: DSIRE database and Wiser et al 2007 p. 7
In addition to this variation, across states these policies vary in their requirements for
implementation of intermediate renewable mandates prior to the reaching of the final goal and by
the mix of renewables that are required.  Additionally some states require newly developed
renewable generation, generally put into production after 1999 and some require that the
generation take place within the state while others do not. (Wiser et al 2007, p.6)
 Despite the variation in implementation, given the common focus of these policies, for
this analysis the RPS will be treated as a single policy instrument.  An exception will be made
for those RPS that are not mandated.  I expect that the impacts on wind development from a
legally mandated RPS requirement will be stronger than for those in which the percentage of
renewable electricity generation is an optional standard for utilities.
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RPS are widely touted as critical factors for renewable energy development and in
particular wind energy development. (RPS 2007, p.2, WPO 2005, p.2)  This general finding is
noteworthy given that the design and components contained in each RPS vary across states and
time.  It is also a strong conclusion given that RPS are often non-binding constraints since the
year for the implementation of the final renewable generation  requirement is outside the sample
time frame.125
For this analysis, I constructed separate variables for optional RPS and mandatory RPS
by state and year of adoption.  See Table 18 for information by state on the implementation of
RPS.
125 Some states have instituted mandatory interim requirements which may have been binding over the sample time
frame.
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Table 18: Renewables Portfolio Standards
Year Effective State Program Expiration
2003 California Renewables Portfolio Standard
2005 Colorado Renewables Portfolio Standard
2001 Illinois Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 Illinois Renewables Portfolio Standard
1983 Iowa Renewables Portfolio Standard
2000 Maine Renewables Portfolio Standard
2008 Michigan Renewables Portfolio Standard
1995 Minnesota Renewables Portfolio Standarda
2001 Minnesota Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard 2007
2007 Minnesota Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 Missouri Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2005 Montana Renewables Portfolio Standard
2003 New Mexico Renewables Portfolio Standard
2004 New York Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 North Dakota Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2007 Oregon Renewables Portfolio Standard
2008 South Dakota Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
1999 Texas Renewables Portfolio Standard
2008 Utah Optional Renewables Portfolio Standard
2006 Washington Renewables Portfolio Standard
1999 Wisconsin Renewables Portfolio Standard
a:  This RPS legislation was focused only on Xcel Energy. It is scheduled to expire in 2010. The mandatory RPS does not apply
to Xcel Energy until 2010.
I used the date enacted for the RPS as the basis for analysis.  Additionally, I constructed
two variables to represent both optional and mandatory RPS, the indicator index and the years
from index.  While RPS like any regulation is not stagnant, a more in depth investigation of the
changes in RPS over time is left for future work.  Table 18 presents RPS by state and year of
implementation for the 25 states included in the sample.126
126 The years listed are the years when the RPS was enacted.  For some states there may be several years between the
date the RPS is enacted and the date in which utilities are required to use produce electricity from renewables.  It is
expected that the enactment of an RPS could spur development to meet future goals even if the RPS mandates are
not binding.
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State Green Power Purchasing/Aggregation
Another program that has been implemented by states is the Green Power Purchasing
Programs (GPA), which outline specific goals for the state government in terms of renewable
energy use.  Table 19 includes a list of states that have implemented such programs.
Table 19: Green Power Purchasing/Aggregation
Year
Effective State
2007 Illinois
2007 Indiana
2005 Iowa
2003 Maine
2001 New York
2006 Wisconsin
Source: DSIRE database
Note: The table includes expiration dates only if they are within the sample time frame. (Prior to 2009)
One example of a GPA is from the state of Illinois.  “In January 2007, the State of Illinois
established a goal for state agencies to purchase 3% of their power from renewable sources by
the end of 2007, 4% by the end of 2008, and 5% by the end of 2009.” (DSIRE, IL)  These
programs provide a direct incentive for renewables development by  mandating that the
government go green.  For the purposes of this analysis, I will focus only on state level
purchasing programs, however the implementation of these programs extends beyond the state to
both municipal governments and the federal government.  A more detailed analysis of the
impacts of all green power purchasing programs and their relationship with other state
renewables programs will be completed in future work.
Given the lag between enactment of legislation and implementation, for the purposes of
this analysis, the effective date of  legislation is used for analysis as opposed to the enacted date.
I constructed two variables to represent GPA programs, the indicator index and the years from
index.
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Federal Production Tax Credit
Along with state regulations and financial incentives, this chapter also analyzes the PTC.
In addition to RPS, the PTC is often cited as critical for wind development.  The PTC is an
inflation adjusted business tax credit that applies to electricity generated from commercial wind
projects for the first ten years after they are developed and reduces the cost of producing wind by
about a third.127 (Wiser, 2007)  The goal of the PTC is to offset energy credits already in place
for other energy sources due to the environmental and energy security benefits of wind energy.
(Wiser, Bolinger, and Barbose, 2007, p.2)  The credit was originally created under the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, but has been allowed to expire several times since its inception. (Wiser,
Bolinger, and Barbose, 2007, p. 1-2)  Its lapses over the years are correlated with decreases in
wind capacity additions and are often blamed for those declines.  In 2005 the AWEA argued
“that the current ‘on-again, off-again’ status of the credit is hobbling project development and
the industry as a whole.” (AWEA, EoWE, p. 4)
For the purposes of this analysis, I constructed a binary PTC variable with a 1 indicating
that the PTC was active for a given year and a 0 indicating that it had lapsed for some time
during the year.  One exception to this construction is that although the PTC was allowed to
lapse in 1999, the impacts of this lapse are conventionally attributed to 2000 due to the lag time
for development.  I followed this convention in this  chapter.  Therefore, I constructed the PTC
indicator variable with a zero for the years 2000, 2002, and 2004.
Market Factors
After the construction of the policy indicators, I constructed the variables to measure the
electricity market impacts.  I collected total electricity generation information from annual state
data provided by the EIA from 1998-2008 as the measure of total quantity of electricity
127 The initial credit was 1.5c/kWh and was directed towards wind plants that were to come online between 1994 and
the middle of 1999.  By 2007, the value of the tax credit had increased to 2.0 c/kWh due to inflation adjustments.
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produced.128 (REA, 2000 – 2008)  I also constructed price variables for natural resources used in
electricity generation, natural gas and coal.129  To construct the natural gas price measure, I
collected data by state and year of commercial natural gas price from the (EIA). (EIA, Gas Price)
For coal prices, I constructed an annual measure due to the fact that information on the average
price of coal delivered to electric utility plants by state was not available for all states.130 (EIA,
Coal Price)  Natural gas and coal are substitute goods in terms of fuel for electricity production.
Increases in prices of these substitute goods would be expected to lead to increases in demand for
alternative fuel sources, including wind.  Also, the volatility of natural gas prices is an oft cited
reason for increases in renewables development generally.  (WPO,  2005, p. 4)  Figure 19
contains average annual real resource prices for the United States.
128 Due to current data limitations, the total electricity measure has not been collected back to 1994.  Forthcoming
work will included this additional information as available.
129 All prices and well costs are real prices, in chained (2000) U.S. dollars, calculated by using gross domestic
product price deflators from the EIA.
130 For states in which coal is not delivered or used in electric utility plants, the price information is missing.  These
states include California, Idaho, Maine, and Washington.  For Washington the price data is missing from 2001
through 2008.
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Figure 19:  Electricity Fuel Prices
The graph above demonstrates that over this time period, from 1994-2008, prices have
been increasing for the United States for both resources.  This upward trend in the price of fossil
fuel resources could be motivating electricity producers to look for alternative fuel sources.  This
analysis will test the impact of that these rising resource prices are having on wind development.
Wind Costs and Turbine Size
As far back as 1989, cost estimates for wind power have been estimated to be in line with
conventional sources and were predicted to fall further. (Gipe, p. 226) The AWEA argued in
2002 that the “cost of wind power at efficient wind farms has declined to a range that is close to
competitive with several forms of conventional power and less expensive than nuclear.”
(GWEMR,  2002, p.7) This is consistent with the argument put forward by Wiser (2007) that
declining costs since 1994 combined with the production tax credit that lowers the cost of wind
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by about 1/3 make wind a cost effective source of energy. (Wiser, March 29, 2007)  The decline
in costs is shown in the Figure 20.131
Figure 20:  Project Costs and Turbine Size
Source: Turbine Size- AWEA projects database, Cost – Berkeley Labs email from Mark Bollinger 03/10
Costs have had an overall decreasing trend until the recently when prices have begun to
rise above the levels of 1994.  Average costs were approximately $3500 per kilowatt in 1985 and
had fallen to just over $1700 per kilowatt by 1994.  By 2008, the average costs had increased to
just over $1900 per kilowatt, this is still only approximately 55% of the 1985 costs. (Wiser and
Bolinger, 2009, p. 33)  Due to these significant changes, falling costs are expected to play a role
in the amount of wind capacity that is added.132
131 The project costs in the graph above include  “turbine purchase and installation, balance of plant, and any
substation and/or interconnection expenses.”  (2008 Market Report, p. 33)
132 In addition to direct costs, financing and transmissions costs may also play a role in wind capacity additions.  I do
not include direct measures of financing or transmissions costs in the analysis, but I do include year indicator
variables to control for the overall influence of year specific variations.  While not a precise measure of changes in
these costs, the year indicators broadly include factors that influence wind capacity in each year.
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These costs declines have been caused in part by technological improvements in turbine
design.  Figure 20 shows that turbine size has been increasing over this time period and taller
towers and larger blades both lead to increases in production. (AWEA, EoWE, p. 1)  This is due
to the fact that wind speeds are higher as the distance from the ground is increased and larger
blades have a large swept area leading to increase production. (AWEA, EoWE, p. 2) The
increases in size of the individual turbines and the addition of larger numbers of turbines per
project also lead to decreased marginal costs. (AWEA, EoWE, p.2)  This significant ramping up
of turbine sizes is expected to also play a role in determining wind capacity changes.  I
constructed two variables, both annual measures of average project costs and average turbine
size.
League of Conservation Voters Scores
The last factor that I have postulated will influence demand for wind generated electricity
is consumer tastes.  According to the theoretical framework, states with higher demand for
renewable energy will result in higher levels of renewable development generally and wind
specifically.  The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores provide a rating for each state’s
Federal Senate and House delegation based on how the state’s Senators and Representatives
voted on key environmental legislation in the previous year. (LCV, Score)  The relevant
legislation is determined by experts from environmental organizations. The score is constructed
on a 0 to 100 scale for each legislator with 0 indicating that the legislator voted against
environmental legislation and a higher score indicative of a more environmentally friendly
legislator.  The legislators scores are then averaged across a state’s legislative delegation in the
Federal Senate and House by year.  My analysis uses these indicators of the overall
environmental friendliness of a state as an indicator for the willingness of a state’s population to
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demand wind development.  It is expected that states with higher LCV scores will have
additional renewable development.
Empirical Framework
Based on the theoretical framework, I focus the empirical analysis on measuring the
influence of renewable energy policies on the growth in added wind capacity after controlling for
market factors and state wind potential.  The 25-state sample covers the time period from 1994
through 2008. 133  This panel allows for the identification of impacts from the policy variables,
that change at most annually at the state level.  Given the distribution of the dependent variable a
random effects Tobit model was used.134 Yit is censored at zero with approximately 40 percent of
the observations at zero.  See Figure 21 for a depiction of the dependent variable over time by
state.
133 Indiana is excluded from the results.  Due to a wind potential of only 30 MW, and an installed capacity in 2008
of four times that amount, Indiana is an outlier.  The wind potential measure increased significantly under the 2010
model.  To avoid this anomaly in the wind potential data the regressions are run without Indiana.
The results presented in Tables 20-22 cover the years 1998 through 2008 due data availability.  Results of
the full 1994-2008 sample are forthcoming.  The analyses were also run using electricity prices as an indicator of the
influence of the electricity market, the results regarding the market and policy variables were consistent in
magnitude and sign to those presented here.  The electricity price variable was not consistently statistically
significant.
134 I include a linear regression in Appendix D, Table D3 for comparison.  Also, The pooled Tobit regression
specification was tested against the random effects Tobit regression and the random effects Tobit regression was
found to provide a better fit.  Fixed effects Tobit was also considered, however, the fixed effects Tobit specification
is known to be biased.  For robustness, I ran linear fixed effects and random effects regressions and used a Hausman
test to determine if the more efficient random effects model was consistent with the fixed effects model.  The results
indicate that the linear random effects model is consistent.
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Figure 21:  Dependent Variable – Added Wind Capacity / Wind Potential by State
The specification of the model is:
??? =	? +?1???? + ?2??? + ? ?3????? + ????? + ?5?? + ?6??? + ?7???? + ????
where Y ~ (0, ¥)
and ??? = ?? + ???
where i = state and t = year. Yit represents the annual state wind capacity per state wind potential.
The main regression results are presented in Tables 20-22, which vary based on the
regulatory variables that are included.  Tables 20 and 20a present results for the sum index, Table
21 includes findings for the indicator index, and Table 22 provides results for the years from
index.
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Table 20: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Sum of Active Programs
Dependent Variable:  Annual
State Wind Capacity / State
Wind Potential
(1)
Full Sample
(2)
Full Sample with Year
Indicators
State Grant and Loan
Program(s) a -0.00369** -0.00363**
(-2.130) (-2.059)
Green Power
Purchasing/Aggregation 0.00584 0.00449
(1.303) (1.002)
Optional Renewables Portfolio
Standard 0.00358 0.00246
(0.837) (0.573)
Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.0101*** 0.0104***
(2.708) (2.765)
Utility Green Power Option(s) a 0.00240*** 0.00227***
(5.961) (5.031)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.00932*** 0.00220
(3.131) (0.203)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.00135* 0.00206*
(1.827) (1.834)
Real Coal Price -0.000108 -4.78e-05
(-0.197) (-0.0229)
Net Electricity Generation
(Thousands of Kilowatthours) 3.23e-08** 3.09e-08*
(2.014) (1.855)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) 5.04e-07 2.30e-05
(0.104) (0.663)
LCV Score (Senate) 4.47e-05 3.17e-05
(1.066) (0.689)
Constant -0.0355*** -0.0724***
(-4.294) (-3.597)
?u (State specific standard
deviation) 0.00381* 0.00421**
(1.919) (2.129)
?e (Observation specific standard
deviation) 0.0154*** 0.0149***
(15.91) (15.80)
? 0.0579 0.0739
Observations 360 360
Pseudo R-squared
Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component. ?u: panel-level standard deviation; ?e: standard deviation of e_it.
a: These indices are the sum of active GPO programs and State Grant and Loan Programs in each state.
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Overall, the findings in Tables 20 through 22 indicate that the regulatory influences of the
PTC, RPS, GPP, and MGPP on wind capacity are consistently positive and statistically
significant.135  In addition, the coefficients on Optional RPS was consistently not significant.
This results is not unexpected for the Optional RPS, since it is a voluntary program.  These
findings are discussed in more detail below along with the remaining policy indicators that
demonstrated some statistical significance.  In terms of electricity market factors, there was some
evidence of significance of several measures, however, there is some variability in the individual
results.  The market factors will be discussed in more detail below. 136
Renewables Portfolio Standard
To begin the discussion of the regression results, I focus on two of the most widely
known and discussed renewable regulations, RPS and the PTC.  The AWEA has consistently
advocated for RPS as an important regulatory mechanism for supporting the growth of wind
energy.  The literature has generally supported the supposition that RPS lead to additional
renewable energy development. (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; Wiser, Porter, and Grace, 2004;
Wiser and Barbose, 2008; Menz and Vachon, 2006).  Counter to the largely descriptive literature
on renewable energy development, Carley (2009) finds that in terms of renewable electricity
generation, RPS are not statistically significant predictors.  The results in this chapter support the
135 MGPP sum index is correlated with the GPP sum index at .66.  Due to this colinearity, the variables are not
included in the same regression.  The coefficient on the MGPP program, not shown in Tables 20 and 20a, was also
positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level if included without the GPP programs.
136 In addition to the market variables presented in the analysis, I also analyzed average turbine size as an indicator
of technological progress and it was consistently not statistically significant.  Also, to determine if there was a
disparate influence of wind potential over time, I analyzed a year-wind potential interaction, it was consistently not
statistically significant.  Lastly, I ran all of the analysis with an alternate dependent variable constructed with 2010
wind potential measures, the magnitude and sign of the coefficients was consistent with the results presented here.
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work that argues for RPS in positively influencing renewable energy development, in this case
wind development.137
The results in Tables 20a and 21 demonstrate that the probability of wind development
occurring increases by between approximately 24 and 33 percent after the implementation of an
RPS.  In addition, given that wind development has occurred, the expected megawatts of wind
capacity per megawatt of wind potential increased by between approximately 0.3 and 0.5
percentage points.
137 The results regarding RPS were robust to the inclusion of year indicators.  See Table 20, column 2 for results
including year indicators.
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Table 20a: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences  - Sum Index
(Marginal Effects)
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Sum of Active Programs
 Dependent Variable:  Annual
State Wind Capacity / State
Wind Potential
(1)
Full Sample:
Probability of Wind
Development
(2)
Full Sample:
Expected Increase in
Wind Capacity Relative
to a State’s Wind
Potential Given That
Wind Development Has
Occurred
State Grant and Loan
Program(s) a -0.0828** -0.00100**
(-2.102) (-2.120)
Green Power
Purchasing/Aggregation 0.139 0.00175
(1.246) (1.180)
Optional Renewables Portfolio
Standard 0.0837 0.00103
(0.811) (0.788)
Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.239*** 0.00306**
(2.678) (2.427)
Utility Green Power Option(s) a 0.0539*** 0.000652***
(5.652) (5.909)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.188*** 0.00229***
(3.581) (3.461)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.0303* 0.000366*
(1.837) (1.835)
Real Coal Price -0.00242 -2.93e-05
(-0.197) (-0.197)
Net Electricity Generation
(Thousands of Kilowatthours) 7.25e-07** 8.77e-09**
(1.995) (2.013)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) 1.13e-05 1.37e-07
(0.104) (0.104)
LCV Scores (Senate) 0.00100 1.21e-05
(1.063) (1.068)
Observations 360 264
Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: These indices are the sum of active GPO programs and State Grant and Loan Programs in each state.  For other
programs, only one program was active in each state.
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Table 21: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences – Indicator Index
(Marginal Effects)
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Year of Initial Implementation
 Dependent Variable:  Annual
State Wind Capacity / State
Wind Potential
(1)
Full Sample:
Probability of Wind
Development
(2)
Full Sample:
Expected Increase in
Wind Capacity Relative
to a State’s Wind
Potential Given That
Wind Development Has
Occurred
State Grant and Loan Program a -0.0918 -0.00121
(-1.341) (-1.341)
Green Power
Purchasing/Aggregation 0.177 0.00246
(1.554) (1.434)
Mandatory Utility Green Power
Option a 0.114 0.00154
(1.189) (1.154)
Optional Renewables Portfolio
Standard 0.0629 0.000840
(0.608) (0.596)
Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.328*** 0.00472***
(4.189) (3.489)
Utility Green Power Option a 0.271*** 0.00367***
(4.716) (4.413)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.174*** 0.00231***
(3.511) (3.398)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.0263 0.000347
(1.524) (1.533)
Real Coal Price 0.00806 0.000106
(0.692) (0.692)
Net Electricity Generation
(Thousands of Kilowatthours) 5.62e-07 7.42e-09
(1.107) (1.115)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) -2.26e-05 -2.98e-07
(-0.215) (-0.214)
LCV Scores (Senate) 0.00102 1.34e-05
(0.941) (0.947)
Observations 360 360
Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: This index is an indicator of the first year for each effective program in each state and year for GPO and state
grant and loan programs.
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Table 22 demonstrates that these results are unexpectedly diminishing over time. These
findings are in contrast with those of Carley (2009) who found that the there was no initial effect
of an RPS on renewable electricity generation generally, but that its influence was increasing
over time.
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Table 22: Tobit Random Effects: Regulations and Market Influences (Marginal Effects)
Regulatory and Financial Incentive Indicators:
Years from Initial Implementation
Dependent Variable:  Annual
State Wind Capacity / State
Wind Potential
(1)
Full Sample:
Probability of Wind
Development
(2)
Full Sample:
Expected Increase in
Wind Capacity Relative
to a State’s Wind
Potential Given That
Wind Development Has
Occurred
State Grant and Loan Program a 0.00297 3.92e-05
(0.572) (0.572)
Green Power
Purchasing/Aggregation a 0.0975*** 0.00129***
(3.362) (3.339)
Mandatory Utility Green Power
Option a 0.0469** 0.000619**
(2.150) (2.166)
Optional Renewables Portfolio
Standard a 0.0133 0.000175
(0.558) (0.556)
Renewables Portfolio Standard a -0.0156* -0.000205*
(-1.682) (-1.663)
Utility Green Power Optiona 0.0474*** 0.000625***
(4.390) (4.390)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.175*** 0.00232***
(3.363) (3.278)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.0352** 0.000464**
(2.052) (2.042)
Real Coal Price -0.0201 -0.000265
(-1.506) (-1.508)
Net Electricity Generation
(Thousands of Kilowatthours) 7.70 x10-7* 1.02 x10-08*
(1.706) (1.711)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) 4.54 x10-06 5.98 x10-08
(0.0425) (0.0425)
LCV Scores (Senate) 0.00168* 2.22 x10-05
(1.689) (1.698)
Observations 360 360
Number of States 24 24
Note: asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
a: This index is an indicator of the number of years from initial implementation for each type of regulatory program
and financial incentive in each state and year except the Federal Production Tax Credit.
Given that the binding constraints for the implementation of each RPS are outside of the
time period of analysis, I expected that the effectiveness of the RPS would increase rather than
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decrease in the years subsequent to its implementation.  In fact, the influence of the RPS is
diminished in the years after its implementation.  The magnitude of the negative influence in
each year after implementation is approximately 1.5 percentage points, significantly smaller than
the initial positive influence of the RPS.  This indicates that long term role of the RPS in
influencing continued wind development after its initial year of implementation is debatable.
The total long term influence cannot be determined until after the mandatory renewable energy
requirements of the RPS become binding.  The information in Table 17 show that generally this
will occur in the next five to ten years.  While the initially positive influence of the RPS is
strongly demonstrated in these results, the fact that this influences diminishes in the years after
implementation make it difficult to conclude whether the long term role of the RPS will be
positive or not.  The final conclusions hinge on the long term influence of the RPS as they
become binding constraints.
Federal Production Tax Credit
The AWEA often argues for the importance of the PTC in influencing wind development
(AWEA, EoWE; GWEMR 1999).  The literature has generally supported this viewpoint, arguing
that the lapses in the PTC lead to decreases in wind development. (Bird et al, 2005; Harper,
Karcher, and Bolinger, 2007).  Evidence of correlation between the total amount of wind
capacity that is added in the United States and an active PTC are clear from Figure 17.  The
findings in this chapter support the supposition of the AWEA and others regarding the
significance of the PTC in influencing added wind capacity.  The coefficient on the PTC is
consistently positive, and statistically significant.
The results in Tables 20a, 21, and 22 demonstrate that the probability of wind
development occurring increases by between approximately 17 and 19 percent with an active
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PTC.  In addition, given that wind development has occurred, the expected megawatts of
additional wind capacity per megawatt of wind potential increased by approximately 0.2
percentage points.
Green Power Purchasing Option Programs and Mandatory Green Power Option Programs
The role of RPS and the PTC are not the only widely discussed renewables programs, in
addition, green power purchasing programs are widely popular.  The results in Table 21 show
that after a state implements a GPP program, the probability of wind development increases by
27 percentage points.  In addition, given that wind development has occurred, a GPP program
increases the expected megawatts of wind capacity per megawatt of wind potential by 0.4
percentage points.  Table 20a shows that these findings are supported by the results for the GPP
sum index.  The results in Table 20a demonstrate that the probability of wind development
increases by approximately five percentage points after each GPP program is implemented by a
state.  In addition, for each program that is implemented, the expected megawatts of added wind
capacity per megawatt of wind potential increases by 0.07 percentage points.138  Table 22 shows
that the findings are robust to the inclusion of the alternate, years from, index.  For each
additional year after the implementation of a GPP program, there is an approximately 5
percentage point increase in the probability of wind development.  In addition, given that wind
development has occurred, there is an expected increase in the megawatts of added wind
capacity per megawatt of wind potential of approximately 0.06 percentage points.
Given the fact that multiple GPP programs are often implemented in a single state, it is
not possible to entirely separate out the effects of additional programs from the influence of the
initial program in the specifications in Table 22.  The fact that the significance of the GPP
138 The findings regarding the GPP sum index are robust to the inclusion of year indicators.  For the GPP indicator
index, however, the statistical significance is diminished to less than ten percent if year indicators are included.
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programs is robust for both the GPP sum and GPP years from indices does demonstrate the
important influence of these programs on increasing wind development.
The expected positive influence of the GPP programs has led some states to mandate
their implementation by utilities.  Tables 21 and 22 demonstrate the positive and statistically
significant influence of the MGPP programs.  The magnitude of the influence of the MGPP
index is less in terms of its initial influence as demonstrated in Table 21, but after its
implementation, its continued yearly influence is as strong as that of the GPP programs as
demonstrated in Table 22.  Given the role of the MGPP in generating GPP programs, it is not
surprising that the influence is stronger in the years after the implementation of a MGPP than it
is in its initial year of implementation.  Clearly, these programs, which allow for the direct
implementation of consumer demand for renewables, have played an important role in increasing
wind capacity across states.
Green Power Purchasing/Aggregation Programs
The last policy that I analyze are green power purchasing mandates for state
governments.  The findings in Tables 20 and 21 show that the implementation of a GPA program
does not have a statistically significant influence on wind development.  The findings in Table
22, however, indicate that for each year after the implementation of the GPA program, there is a
positive and statistically significant influence on wind development.  States with a GPA will on
average have an increased probability of wind development of approximately 10 percentage
points.  In addition, for each year after the GPA program is adopted, there will be an increase in
the expected megawatts of wind capacity per megawatts of wind potential of approximately 0.01
percentage points.  This positive influence over the longer term could point to either a delay in
the adoption of the renewable energy to meet the goals of the GPA or influence of the state GPA
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on municipalities leading to municipal GPA implementation.  Future work will focus on
analyzing additional GPA programs.
Electricity Market Factors
The regression results in Tables 20 through 22 indicate the significance of various market
factors, including natural gas prices, and the total net electricity generation.  The findings,
however, are not robust to the inclusion of the alternate policy indices.  This lack of robustness
suggests some omitted variable bias leading to an overstatement of the significance of individual
market factors.  Interestingly, taken together, the market factors are consistently jointly
statistically significant.  This indicates that there is an overall influence from the electricity
markets after controlling for the regulatory environment.
League of Conservation Voters Scores
The final factor that was considered was the role of consumer preferences for renewables
development.  As an indicator of consumer preferences by state, I analyzed LCV scores for both
the state Senate and House.  The state Senate score was consistently positive indicating that a
higher environmentally friendly state legislative delegation leads to additional wind capacity,
however, it was generally not statistically significant.139  The limited influence of the LCV
scores could indicate that preferences are not a main factor in determining wind development.
Forthcoming work will analyze the role of alternative preference measures to determine if the
lack of statistical significance is due to the choice of indicator variable.
139 The House LCV score was statistically significant at the ten percent level for both the sum and indicator indices,
but not for the years from index.  The magnitude of the coefficient was consistently not economically significant.
For a ten percentage point increase in the index, the probability of wind development increased by two percentage
points.
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Conclusion
The findings in this chapter demonstrate that both renewable energy regulations and the
electricity market influence added wind capacity increases in the United States.  The
implementation of the PTC, an RPS or a GPP program, either by a utility or a state mandate for
utilities, increased added wind capacity relative to a state’s wind potential.  The influence of the
GPP is increasing in the years after implementation, while for an RPS the effect diminishes in
the years after initial implementation.  State GPA programs also positively influenced wind
development, while State Loan and Grant programs were ineffective.
In terms of market factors, although no single electricity market indicator was
consistently statistically significant, taken together the electricity market did have a statistically
significant influence on wind development.  As expected, given the measures included, the
influence was positive.  Also, consumer preferences, as measured through LCV scores, did not
prove to be a significant factor in increasing wind development.
This chapter demonstrates that while renewable energy regulations are not universally
significant in influencing wind development, they are having a positive influence in the wind
market.  The implementation of the PTC, an RPS and GPP programs in particular, lead to
increased added wind capacity.
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION
The future of energy development in the United States and throughout the world is
unclear.  The types of energy development will be determined by both market and political
influences and will shift with changes in both political winds and climatic ones.  The latest
environmental catastrophe to alter the path of energy development is the earthquake in Japan.  Its
potentially disastrous effects on the nuclear energy plants in Japan have caused the world to take
a collective breath, and led to a reconsideration of nuclear energy plants in several countries.
The earthquake is one concern in a long stream of issues that have shifted energy
development due to  environmental factors.  The peak oil theory and climate change concerns
have led to calls for reduced fossil fuel development, while national security concerns have led
many policy makers to call for increased domestic fossil fuel development.  These competing
pressures are reflected in both the political stance of the state and federal elected political
leadership and the market for both traditional and renewable energy.  My dissertation contributes
to the overall understanding of the role that politics, policies, and markets play in determining
energy market outcomes.  As the future of energy development in the United States evolves in
the coming decades, these factors will continue to determine the path of energy development.
The success or failure of which will in large part determine how successful this country is in
continuing on our historic path of economic growth.
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Chapter 2
* The political party of the Senate Committees is the same as that of the Senate Majority Leader.
Full 16 State Sample
Statistics
Number of
Competitive
Leases Issued
Annually
Acres of
Competitive
Leases Issued
Annually
Acres of
Competitive
Leases Issued
per Acre of
BLM Lands
Political Party
of U.S.
President
(1=Republican
0=Democrat)
Ideology  of
the U.S.
President
(-1,1)
Count 496 496 496 496 496
Mean 108.9052 79022.99 .0183181 .6440945 0.1836774
Median 14 3385.84 .0012408 1 0.49
Standard
Deviation 254.7718 194515.4 .0492334 .4789754 0.4617792
Maximum 1920 1516111 .4623903 1 0.594
Minimum 0 0 0 0 -0.44
Statistics
Political Party
of Senate
Majority
Leader*
(1=Republican
0=Democrat)
Ideology
of the
Senate
Majority
Leader
(-1,1)
Ideology
of the
Senate
Natural
Resources
Committee
Chair
(-1,1)
Ideology of
the Senate
Environment
and Public
Works Chair
(-1,1)
Ideology of the
Senate
Appropriations
Committee
Chair
(-1,1)
Percentage
of State
Population
belonging to
the Sierra
Club
Count 496 496 496 496 496 432
Mean 0.516129
0.022645
2 0.0830645 -0.090129 -0.0729355 0.001931
Median 1 0.25 0.273 -0.009 0.006 0.001627
Standard
Deviation 0.5002146
0.372438
9 0.3417217 0.3950423 0.2444807 0.001407
Maximum 1 0.474 0.54 0.742 0.345 0.011523
Minimum 0 -0.433 -0.376 -0.567 -0.374 2.65 x 10-6
Statistics
U.S. Real
Cost per
Well Drilled
(Thousand
$)
Count of
Federal
Regulatory
Changes
Regarding
Competitive
Leasing by
Year
Real
Commercial
Natural Gas
Price
($ / Mcf)
Real First
Purchase
Oil Price
 ($ / Barrel)
U.S. Real
Natural Gas
Futures
Price ($ /
Million
BTU)
U.S. Real
Oil Futures
Price
($ / Barrel)
Count 480 496 496 496 240 416
Mean 829.8608 1.032258 6.372357 29.06461 4.221136 32.28402
Median 622.382 0 6.018624 23.25863 3.958554 25.40288
Standard
Deviation 601.8782 3.697524 1.688206 15.08248 1.933172 15.52661
Maximum 3481.8 20 11.09054 79.11977 7.975082 81.48171
Minimum 382.009 0 0 9.121818 1.837783 14.92603
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BLM States Sample (11 Westernmost States)
Statistics
Number of
Competitive
Leases Issued
Annually
Acres of
Competitive
Leases Issued
Annually
Acres of
Competitive
Leases Issued
per Acre of
BLM Lands
Political Party
of U.S.
President
(1=
Republican
0=Democrat)
Ideology  of the
U.S. President
(-1,1)
Count 341 341 341 341 341
Mean 153.1144 113001 0.011143 .6440945 0.183677
Median 34 13497.57 0.001086 1 0.49
Standard
Deviation 296.7809 226596.1 0.038378 .4789754 0.462019
Maximum 1920 1516111 0.46239 1 0.594
Minimum 0 0 0 0 -0.44
Statistics
Political
Party of
Senate
Majority
Leader*
(1=
Republican
0=Democrat)
Ideology
of the
Senate
Majority
Leader
(-1,1)
Ideology of
the Senate
Natural
Resources
Committee
Chair
(-1,1)
Ideology of
the Senate
Environment
and Public
Works Chair
(-1,1)
Ideology of the
Senate
Appropriations
Committee
Chair
(-1,1)
Percentage
of State
Population
belonging
to the
Sierra Club
Count 341 341 341 341 341 297
Mean 0.516129 0.022645 0.0830645 -0.090129 -0.0729355 0.002478
Median 1 0.25 0.273 -0.009 0.006 0.001964
Standard
Deviation 0.500474 0.372632 0.3417217 0.3950423 0.2444807 0.001371
Maximum 1 0.474 0.54 0.742 0.345 0.011523
Minimum 0 -0.433 -0.376 -0.567 -0.374 2.65 x 10-6
Statistics
U.S. Real
Cost per Well
Drilled
(Thousand $)
Count of
Federal
Regulatory
Changes
Regarding
Competitive
Leasing by
Year
Real
Commercial
NG Price
($ / Mcf)
Real First
Purchase
Oil Price
($ / Barrel)
U.S. Real
Natural
Gas
Futures
Price
($ / Million
BTU)
U.S. Real Oil
Futures
Price
($ / Barrel)
Count 330 341 341 341 165 286
Mean 829.8608 1.032258 6.582121 27.9404 4.221136 32.28402
Median 622.382 0 6.210856 22.91073 3.958554 25.40288
Standard
Deviation 602.2009 3.699223 1.711404 14.87882 1.935013 15.53512
Maximum 3481.8 20 11.09054 78.60516 7.975082 81.48171
Minimum 382.009 0 3.566253 9.121818 1.837783 14.92603
* The political party of the Senate Committees is the same as that of the Senate Majority Leader.
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Chapter 3
Summary Statistics 1977 Sample
Statistics
Number of
Permits
Issued
U.S. Real
Natural Gas
Prices
($ /  Mcf)
U.S. Real Oil
Prices
($ /  Barrel)
U.S. Real
Natural Gas
Futures
($/Million BTU)
U.S. Real Oil
Futures
($ /  Barrel)
Count 420 420 406 182 336
Mean 11.48333 0.153167 1.189335 0.291949 0.558738
Median 5 0.08 0.705 -0.04148 0.340978
Standard
Deviation 1511.283 0.930196 7.843846 1.167729 6.534807
Maximum 10201 5.64 49.28 2.331085 12.28143
Minimum -14984 -3.58 -23.77 -1.99535 -18.8923
Statistics
Three Year
Moving
Average
Natural Gas
price
Three Year
Moving
Average Oil
price
U.S. Real Cost
per Well
Drilled
(Thousand $)
Proved
Natural Gas
Reserves
(Mmcf)
Proved Oil
Reserves
(Mbls)
Count 392 378 420 394 410
mean 0.166828 0.809762 98.3469 108.6193 -21.8488
Median 0.075 0.765 46.23999 5 -2
Standard
Deviation 0.469294 4.936268 316.6221 1417.948 119.4244
Maximum 2.096667 16.42667 1678.816 6552 971
Minimum -1.23667 -12.0433 -249.977 -24147 -877
Statistics
Political Party
of U.S.
President
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of Senate
Majority Leader
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of Governor
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of State Senate
Majority
Leader
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of State House
Majority
Leader
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Count 434 420 434 434 434
Mean 0.612903 0.533333 0.453917 0.592166 0.440092
Median 1 1 0 1 0
Standard
Deviation 0.487648 0.499483 0.498446 0.491999 0.496971
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Note: All variables are first differenced with the exception of the political variables.
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Summary Statistics 1990 Sample
Statistics
Number of
Permits
Issued
Real
Commercial
Natural Gas
Prices
($ / Mcf)
Real First
Purchase Oil
Prices
($ /  Barrel)
U.S. Real
Natural Gas
Futures Prices
($/Million BTU)
U.S. Real Oil
Futures Prices
($ /  Barrel)
Count 339 342 342 247 342
Mean 68.89381 0.168509 1.944415 0.291949 1.97244
Median 10 0.08 1.565 -0.04148 2.211349
Standard
Deviation 644.8772 0.958527 5.405004 1.166881 5.339584
Maximum 3591 2.81 28.58 2.331085 12.28143
Minimum -4548 -3.54 -7.74 -1.99535 -6.67445
Statistics
Three Year
Moving
Average
Natural
Gas price
Three
Year
Moving
Average
Oil price
U.S. Real
Cost per Well
Drilled
(Thousand $)
Proved
Natural
Gas
Reserves
(Mmcf)
Proved Oil
Reserves
(Mbls)
Percentage
of Total
Wells
Drilled
Horizontally
Count 342 342 342 324 340 304
Mean 0.182232 1.722573 167.8152 179.3302 -21.6177 0.008479
Median 0.07 1.091667 65.05347 2.5 -2 0.0055
Standard
Deviation 0.409733 3.330278 385.5893 782.3347 93.99316 0.018197
Maximum 1.443333 9.389999 1678.816 6552 412 0.04994
Minimum -0.69 -3.32333 -120.233 -2018 -760 -0.01833
Statistics
Political Party
of U.S.
President
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of Senate
Majority
Leader
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of Governor
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of State Senate
Majority
Leader
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Political Party
of State House
Majority
Leader
(1= Republican
0 = Democrat
Count 342 342 342 342 342
Mean 0.555556 0.555556 0.581871 0.561404 0.394737
Median 1 1 1 1 0
Standard
Deviation 0.497632 0.497632 0.493974 0.496942 0.48951
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Note: All variables are first differenced with the exception of the political variables.
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Chapter 4
Added Wind
Capacity
(MW)
Wind Capacity
(MW) / Wind
Potential
(MW)
Net Generation
of  Electricity
(Thousands
kWh)
Real
Commercial
NG Price
($/Mcf)
Real U.S. Coal
Prices
($/Short Ton)
Mean 336.4659 0.00367642 81919.81 7.397992 19.29364
Median 53 0 49470.85 7.41 18.21
Standard
Deviation 724.2453 0.0129579 82052.47 1.972993 2.98338
Maximum 7113 0.1144652 405492.3 13.42 26.62
Minimum 0 0 6136.605 0 16.78
LCV score
Senate
LCV score
House
Capacity-
Weighted
Average
Project Costs
($/KW)
Average
Turbine Size
(MW)
Year and Wind
Potential (GW)
interaction
Mean 44.53409 40.95455 1471.997 1.087104 1.01 x1008
Median 47 40.5 1439.52 1.1412 5.80 x1007
Standard
Deviation 33.27896 25.8661 210.5465 0.401866 9.91 x1007
Maximum 100 100 1915.41 1.795789 2.78x1008
Minimum 0 0 1202.76 0.496061 819180
Note: All of the summary statistics in the Table above are for the 24 state sample and the time period 1998-2008.
143
Appendix B – Colorado Sample Application for Permit to Drill
Source: (COGCC,APD)
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Appendix C
Table C1:  Discrepancy between Cumulative Measures
State Discrepancy (MW) Percentage of 1999 Level
Attributed to the Discrepancy
California 59 3.7%
Iowa 5 2%
Nebraska 1 33%
Texas 6 3.3%
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Appendix D
Figure D1:  U.S. Futures Prices and Well Costs
0
10
0
R
ea
l D
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 B
ar
re
l
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Year
Source: EIA
U.S. Oil Futures Prices
0
10
R
ea
l D
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 M
ill
io
n 
B
TU
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Source: EIA
U.S. NG Futures Prices
0
20
00
40
00
Th
ou
sa
nd
s 
D
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 W
el
l (
R
ea
l)
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Year
Source: EIA
*Includes: Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Dry Wells
U.S. Real Cost per Well Drilled (Thousand Dollars per Well)*
146
Figure D2:  U.S. Senate and President Ideology Scores
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Table D1: Linear Models – Chapter 2
Dependent Variable:  BLM
Acres Leased per Acre of
BLM Lands
Political Variable of Interest – Ideology
of Senate Natural Resources
Committee Chair
(1)
Fixed Effects
(2)
Random Effects
U.S. Real Oil Futures (Dollars
per Barrel) 0.000113 0.000160
(0.653) (0.651)
Ideology Score Committee
Chair 0.0159* 0.0163*
Continuous (-1, 1) (1.944) (1.891)
Count of Regulatory Changes
by Year of Implementation 0.000234 0.000109
(0.723) (0.885)
Post 1987 Indicator 0.0160 0.0208***
(1.316) (2.872)
Post 1992 Indicator 0.00380 0.00846
(0.316) (1.510)
Post 2005  Indicator 0.0236* 0.0216
(1.789) (1.286)
Time Trend 0.000826 7.45x10-5***
(By State) (0.422) (2.793)
U.S. Real Cost per Crude Oil,
Natural Gas, and Dry Well
Drilled (Thousand Dollars) -3.76x10-6 -2.24 x10-7
(-0.509) (-0.0590)
Constant -0.224 -4.91x10-5*
(-0.433) (0.0392)
R-squared .092 .11
Observations 400 400
Number of states 16 16
Note:  asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. ? is the percent contribution to the total
variance of the panel-level variance component.
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Table D2: Price Correlations – Chapter 3
Real
Commercial
Natural Gas
Prices
($/ Mcf)
Real First
Purchase
Oil Prices
($/Barrel)
U.S. Real
Natural
Gas
Futures
Price
($/Million
BTU)
U.S. Real
Oil
Futures
Price
($/Barrel)
Three
Year
Moving
Average of
Natural
Gas price
Three
Year
Moving
Average of
Oil price
Real Commercial
Natural Gas Prices
($/ Mcf) 1
Real First Purchase
Oil Prices ($/Barrel) 0.1559 1
U.S. Real Natural Gas
Futures Price
($ / Million BTU) 0.3277 0.5371 1
U.S. Real Oil Futures
Prices ($/Barrel) 0.1676 0.991 0.5241 1
Three Year Moving
Average of Natural
Gas price 0.4885 0.1462 0.0023 0.1662 1
Three Year Moving
Average of Oil price 0.2043 0.5003 -0.0463 0.5344 0.5867 1
Note:  All prices are first differenced.
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Table D3: Linear Models – Chapter 4
Dependent Variable:  Annual
State Wind Capacity / State
Wind Potential
Fixed Effects
Specification
Random Effects
Specification
State Grant and Loan
Program(s) a -0.00356 -0.00403
(-0.776) (-1.058)
Green Power
Purchasing/Aggregation 0.00651 0.00541
(0.896) (0.735)
Optional Renewables Portfolio
Standard 0.00508 0.00746
(0.971) (1.143)
Renewables Portfolio Standard 0.00140 -0.00165
(0.369) (-0.312)
Utility Green Power Option(s) a 0.0127* 0.00680*
(2.042) (1.871)
Federal Production Tax Credit 0.00333** 0.00320**
(2.772) (2.117)
Commercial NG Price ($/Mcf) 0.00245* 0.00227*
(1.963) (1.737)
Real Coal Price 8.18e-05 0.000389
(0.102) (0.527)
Total Quantity of Electricity
Generation 0.000270 0.000383
(0.775) (1.251)
Capacity-Weighted Average
Project Costs ($/KW) -5.20 x10-08 2.37 x10-08
(-0.444) (1.636)
LCV Score (Senate) 1.86 x10-06* 1.92 x10-06*
(1.969) (1.902)
Constant 9.63x10-05 8.57 x10-05
(1.275) (1.434)
Observations 360 360
R-squared 0.288
Number of States 24 24
a: These indices are the sum of active GPO programs and State Grant and Loan Programs in each state.
